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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Federal Reserve has asserted, with scant objection in the scholarly 
literature, that it does not play a role in the problem of economic inequality in 
the American economy.1  This claim asserts Fed inequality neutrality, despite 
the role that Federal Reserve mortgage deregulation played in generating the 
financial crisis. Moreover, both wealth and income inequality are the highest 
they have been since 1928. The United States is more unequal than most of its 
developed world peers.2 The Pew Research Center found that “the black-white 
income gap in the US has persisted, with the difference in median household 
incomes between whites and blacks, going from $19,000 in 1967 to roughly 
$27,000 (measured in 2012 dollars).”3 After the financial crisis the racial 
wealth gap has grown dramatically.4   
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the American inequality crisis 
converged to provide a rare opportunity to challenge macroeconomic ortho-
doxies that led to the financial collapse and enlarged preexisting economic 
inequalities. The fact that housing finance was at the center of the 2008 
financial crisis, highlighted yet another problem in the longstanding history of 
private and governmental racial discrimination in access to housing finance 
and the resulting economic inequality by race. 5   
In this Article, I challenge the Federal Reserve’s claim of inequality 
neutrality. This project was sparked when I listened to the entirety6 of the 
																																								 																				
1 See Nomination of Janet L. Yellen, of California, to be Chairman of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban 
Affairs, 113th. Cong. 23-35 (2013) [hereinafter Yellen Nomination] (statement of Janet L. 
Yellen, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“Economists have 
spent a lot of time trying to understand what is responsible for widening inequality. Many of 
the underlying factors are things that are outside of the Federal Reserve's ability to address.”). 
Once she became the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Yellen 
demonstrated the intellectual curiosity and leadership one might expect from an academic 
economist.  Her speeches to the American Economic Association after her confirmation set 
a new research agenda for the entire macroeconomics profession. Interconnectedness and 
Systemic Risk, infra note 190. 
2 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: 
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. ECON 519, 520–21 (2016).  
3 Drew Desilver, 5 Facts About Economic Inequality, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/07/5-facts-about-economic-inequality/. 
4 SARAH BURD-SHARPS & REBECCA RASCH, IMPACT OF THE US HOUSING CRISIS ON THE 
RACIAL WEALTH GAP ACROSS GENERATIONS 9-14 (2015). 
5 EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, 
IDENTITY & ECONOMICS 102–03 (2d ed. 2011). 
6 I live tweeted my reactions to the hearings Emma Coleman Jordan. @EconomicJustice, 
TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2013), https://twitter.com/economicjustice.    
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confirmation hearings of Chairwoman Janet Yellen.7  I was puzzled by her 
response to a series of pointed questions from Senators concerned about 
increasing wage stagnation and economic inequality. Yellen identified global-
ization, technology, and educational deficits as the source of the inequalities 
we see. Yellen concluded, “What can the Fed do? We cannot change all of 
those trends.”8 
The Federal Reserve in its role as financial regulator was a major cause 
of the mortgage securities financial crisis. The Fed contributed to inequality in 
three significant ways. First, they contributed through inaction. The reduction 
in oversight of origination practices for home mortgage lending is widely 
acknowledged to be a cause of the financial crisis.9  The Federal Reserve was 
the one entity with the power to impose responsible qualification standards for 
home loans. It failed to exercise the power it had.10 
The Fed did not reign in subprime lending when it became a rapidly 
growing segment of the market for mortgages and when the Fed was the only 
federal regulator with authority to do so.11 As the subprime loan origination 
and distribution underwriting standards deteriorated, with abundant evidence 
of pervasive racial discrimination, the Fed did not intervene. Subprime mort-
gages were disproportionately sold to people of color.12  Borrowers in minority 
																																								 																				
7 Yellen Nomination, supra note 1, at 4-84. 
8 Id. at 35.  To be fair, Chairwoman Yellen has a strong record of leadership on unemploy-
ment and the potential impact thereof: “Dr. Yellen's nomination is especially timely as our 
nation struggles with high unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession. She has 
devoted a large portion of her professional and academic career to studying the labor market, 
unemployment, monetary policy, and the economy.”  Id. at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Tim 
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).                                                              
9 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) concluded “Widespread failures in 
financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s 
financial markets.”  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/ 
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT]. 
10 Id. at xvii. 
11 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that “the prime example is the Federal 
Reserve’s pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages, which it could have done by 
setting prudent mortgage–lending standards. The Federal Reserve was the one entity 
empowered to do so and it did not.”  Id. 
12  See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST & WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF 
SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 14-19 (2006) [hereinafter UNFAIR LENDING] (analyzing 50,000 
mortgages and revealing statistically significant disparities between minority borrowers and 
white borrowers). 
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neighborhoods faced greater odds of receiving a subprime prepayment penalty 
by a statistically significant margin.13 The Fed disregarded evidence that 
African Americans were one-third and Latinos were 45% more likely to get a 
high-priced loan than white borrowers with the same credit score.14  The Fed 
failed to intervene when it received persistent reports of racial steering by 
unregulated brokers. The record of racial steering by the nation’s largest banks 
is incontrovertible. The Department of Justice settlement of racial steering 
cases against the largest bank and the largest independent mortgage broker 
provides ample documentation of the widespread nature of this problem.15 
Second, the Fed undertook a series of deregulatory actions that led to the 
crisis and exacerbated preexisting economic inequalities. The Fed’s program of 
aggressive deregulation permitted banks to shift mortgage lending off-balance 
sheet, and thus evade the safety net provided by regulated capital cushions. This, 
in turn, opened the door to the development of the unregulated shadow banking16 
system dependent on high leverage as the instability associated with leverage.  
This sector lacked transparency to permit monitoring the size of its cumulative 
balance sheet and interconnections among its counter parties. Shadow banks 
provided short term financing for a daisy chain of origination and distribution 
channels. Unregulated brokers became a major source of new subprime 
mortgages. Many of these brokers relied on discriminatory racial steering 
practices to generate a large volume of high cost subprime loans with features 
that rendered them unsustainable for the low-income borrowers to whom they 
were directed. The Fed played the lead role in weakening the financial system 
by approving the off-balance-sheet path for complex structured financial 
products that evaded the capital requirements applicable to formal banks.  The 
Fed directly approved double dipping, tax-advantaged capital dilution elements 
of Bank Holding Company business plans that increased systemic risk.17 The 
																																								 																				
13 DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN & RICHARD ZHAI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BOR-
ROWERS IN HIGHER MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE PREPAYMENT 
PENALTIES 1 (2005).   
14 UNFAIR LENDING, supra note 12, at 14, 16–19. 
15 The DOJ announced that “Wells Fargo had also systematically placed African-American 
and Hispanic Latino borrowers in subprime loans, while placing similarly-qualified white 
borrowers in prime loans.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S ACCOMP-
LISHMENTS 2009–2012 23 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/crt/us-department-justice-civil-
rights-division-accomplishments-2009-2012. 
16 The term, usually attributed to Paul McCulley, who first used it at a meeting of central 
bankers attending the annual Jackson Hole retreat in 2007, refers to a system of credit 
intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system. See 
generally Laura E. Kores, What is Shadow Banking? 50 FIN. & DEV. 42 (2013). 
17 See Kim E. Lawry, Todd G. Eich & J. Michelle Grotts, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Trust Preferred 
Securities and the Capital Strength of Banking Organizations, 7 SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 3, 3–6 
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Fed’s bank deregulatory policies, listed above, contributed to increasing wealth 
inequality. The immediate cumulative impact of these policies can be seen in the 
decline of household net worth, which fell $16 trillion, or 24% from the third 
quarter 2007 to first quarter 2009.18   
The Pew Research Center found that the portrait of declining wealth 
was unequal among racial groups. During the crisis, African-Americans 
experienced a 53% decline and Hispanic a 66% decline compared to a 16% 
decline for white households.19 There was a significant racial difference in 
wealth recovery after the Crisis. Pew found that from 2010 to 2013, the median 
wealth of white households increased from $138,600 to $141,900, or by 2.4%.  
By contrast, the median wealth of black households fell 33.7%, from $16,600 
in 2010 to $11,000 in 2013. Among Hispanics, median wealth decreased by 
14.3%, from $16,000 to $13,700. For all families—white, black and 
Hispanic—median wealth is still less than its pre-recession level.20 
Third, the Fed contributed to the problem of inequality by failing to 
understand that the unregulated, structured finance pipeline to off-balance-
sheet securitizations allowed the financial sector to multiply fees and max-
imize profits. In fact, the unregulated financial sector surged dramatically 
accounting for 29% of all profits in the economy,21 while the middle and 
bottom of the wealth and income scale absorbed the losses resulting from this 
economic disaster.  
Perhaps most distressingly, once the crisis hit in September 2008, the 
Fed adopted an incoherent application of the principle of moral hazard when it 
provided $12.8 trillion of emergency assistance to shore up the unregulated 
																																								 																				
(2010) [hereinafter FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS] (providing the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s criticisms of the Federal Reserve’s decision to allow Bank Holding Companies, 
regulated by the Federal Reserve, to treat Trusted Preferred Securities issued by those Companies 
as Tier 1 Capital).  See generally discussion of “TruPS Regulatory Arbitrage Frenzy,” infra note 18. 
18 Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell & Harvey Rosenblum, How Bad Was It? The Costs and 
Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis, in 10 FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, 
STAFF PAPERS (Paper No. 20, 2013). 
19 RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH GAPS 
RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, AND HISPANICS 5 (2011). 
20 Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic 
Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/.   
21 This Article examines the contributions of Fed regulatory policies to economic inequality.  
A different discussion of the role of Fed monetary policy, especially the novel quantitative 
easing program, in enhancing economic inequality is outside the scope of this paper.  There 
is intense discussion among macroeconomists about how interest rate policy and aggressive 
bond buying stimulate the economy in the absence of legislative stimulus to replace the weak 
consumer demand during the recession.  The monetary policy critique of the Fed contribution 
to inequality is robust and interesting, but is not a part of my argument.   
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shadow bank money market funds, tri party repo and asset backed commercial 
paper markets. The Fed’s commitment to consistent application of moral 
hazard22 to dissuade market actors from expecting government rescues will be 
a matter of controversy for years to come.   Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, 
for instance, had many similarities in their distressed balance sheets; both were 
filled with mortgage backed assets and dependent on overnight funding from 
repo lenders. The Fed and Treasury explanations for saving Bear Stearns on 
the one hand and letting Lehman fail shortly thereafter have varied from “they 
had a hole in their balance sheet”23 and “the troubles at Lehman had been well 
known for some time . . . Thus we judged that investors and counterparties had 
had time to take precautionary measures”24 to we “did not have the legal ability 
to save Lehman because the firm did not have sufficient collateral to secure a 
loan from the Fed under Sec 13(3).”25 These actions thus triggered massive 
uncertainty and panic in the opaque “shadow banking sector.”26   
Finally, the Fed’s incoherent fidelity to the principle of moral hazard 
led them to refuse to provide direct assistance to homeowners with unsustain-
able home mortgages.  We can see that the Fed’s moral hazard myopia directly 
contributed to post-crisis inequality by its refusal to use its emergency lending 
authority to establish a facility for restructuring home mortgages during the 
crisis.  There was ample precedent for this approach in the 1934 New Deal 
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) whereby HOLC did restructure 
mortgages to help individual citizens as well as banks. 
This Article provides an introductory analysis of Fed actions before, 
during, and after the 2008 financial crisis to challenge the accuracy of the claim 
that “inequality was not within the jurisdiction of the Fed.” My goal for this 
Article and my research agenda for the foreseeable future is to answer the 
question, “What can the Fed Do About Inequality?” 
																																								 																				
22 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 331 (providing insight into how 
the Fed, and the New York Fed in particular, relied on moral hazard during the 2008 Lehman 
bankruptcy). In a September 2008 memo circulated at the Federal Reserve during the 
Lehman crisis, New York Fed Senior Vice President Patricia Moeser wrote: “No more 
Maiden Lane LLCs and no equity position by [the] Fed. Moral hazard and reputation cost is 
too high. If the Fed agrees to another equity investment, it signals that everything [the Fed] 
did in March in terms of temporary liquidity backstops is useless. Horrible precedent; in the 
long run MUCH worse than [bankruptcy] . . . [which would be a] mess on every level, but 
fixes the moral hazard problem.”  
23 Id. at 325. 
24 Id. at 340. 
25 Id.; Jennifer Dauble, Larry Kudlow Interviews Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson 
on CNBC’s “Kudlow & Company” (Transcript Included), CNBC (July 23, 2007, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/19921217.  
26 See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 27-37. 
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I. INEQUALITY OVERVIEW 
 
A. America’s Inequality Problem  
 
1. A Racial History of Housing: The Overlooked Financial Crisis 
 
A search of the Fed Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
transcripts from 2007-2008 fails to reveal a single mention of race–not one 
within the entire 1,800 pages. The financial crisis was a sad and tangled 
morass of human and economic failures that spanned the depth and breadth of 
the market for home mortgages.27 In this section, I look at the active role of 
pre-existing economic and social inequality28 in setting the conditions for the 
first subprime mortgage products. These loan products contained many 
undesirable features, including higher interest rates,29 points, and fees; 
prepayment penalties; and variable rate payment schedules, often packaged as 
‘pay option’ loans with negative amortization balloons. John Martin argues 
that the high-risk cocktail of subprime loan features, combined with the rise 
of the originate-to-distribute model of lending, precipitated the recent global 
financial panic and economic collapse.30 In subsequent sections, I explore how 
neo-classical economic theories31 about the dynamics of racial discrimination 
in markets32 served to inhibit the regulatory response to widespread consumer 
rights violations in the markets for subprime loans, even in the face of 
accumulating evidence. 
																																								 																				
27 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the 
Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets: Housing, Mortgage 
Markets, and Foreclosures (Dec. 4, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/sp 
eech/bernanke20081204a.htm. 
28 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY RACE AND HISPANIC 
ORIGIN (2000) (indicating that, in 1999, the median income of Blacks was $29,423, 
compared to $45,367 for whites).  
29 ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY LENDING: A REPORT 
FROM THE COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 2 (2001). 
30 JOHN D. MARTIN ET AL., A PRIMER ON THE ROLE OF SECURITIZATION IN THE CREDIT 
MARKET CRISIS OF 2007 1 (2011). 
31 Gary Stanley Becker, The Economics of Racial Discrimination 41 (Jun. 1955) 
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago).   
32 Id.; EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA’S LATEST BOOM AND 
BUST 24 (2007) (“[R]acial minorities were basically shut out of the first American housing 
boom at the close of World War II . . . [and currently] housing and mortgage markets have 
become so complicated that discrimination seems to take place in many subtle ways.”) 
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2. The Animal Spirits of Racial Exploitation:33 History of Govern-
ment Sponsored Racially Discriminatory Mortgage Loans 
 
Homeownership is the single most important means through which 
Americans accumulate asset wealth.  It is the centerpiece of middle class family 
balance sheets.  It follows, then, that the wealth gap between African Amer-
icans and other racial minorities and whites is largely attributable to the 
nation’s history of racial discrimination in both the public and private sector 
housing markets. 
The housing industry was crushed by the financial exigencies of the 
Great Depression, forcing the US government to abandon its traditionally 
passive role in the residential housing market.  Indeed, “[b]etween 1928 and 
1933, home construction declined by 95 percent and spending on home 
improvements fell by 90 percent.”34  The Roosevelt administration responded 
to the housing crisis of the Great Depression by introducing several programs, 
including the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), The Fair Housing 
Administration (FHA), and the Veterans Administration (VA). Housing was a 
central building block of government support for FDR’s “forgotten man” at the 
bottom of the economic pyramid. These government entities would implement 
and institutionalize racially discriminatory practices that excluded African 
Americans from homeownership.  From 1930 to 1960, “fewer than one percent 
of all mortgages in the nation were issued to African Americans.”35 
The HOLC, a New Deal program created under the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board in 1933, was authorized to purchase qualifying mortgages from 
financial institutions in exchange for tax-exempt 4%, eighteen-year bonds. 
HOLC restructured these mortgages into fifteen- to twenty-year, fixed-rate, 
fully amortized obligations at 5% interest rates, which benefitted borrowers by 
reducing their payment burdens. “The HOLC was not quick to foreclose on 
delinquent loans, being ‘as considerate of delinquent but deserving borrowers 
as its responsibility to the Federal Government and the taxpaying public will 
																																								 																				
33 See generally GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
(2009). 
34 See Charles Lewis Nier III, The Shadow of Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial 
Predatory Lending and Its Impact Upon African American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. PA. 
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 174 (2007-2008) (citing KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS 
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 118 (1985) (citing STEPHAN 
THERNSTROM, POVERTY AND PROGRESS: SOCIAL MOBILITY IN A NINETEENTH CENTURY CITY 
117 (1964)) (explaining the effect of the Great Depression on the residential housing market). 
35 Id. at 185 (citing DANIEL KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF 
SUBURBIA 7 (1995)). 
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permit.’”36 The HOLC often counseled delinquent borrowers and readjusted 
payment schedules, rather than moving quickly to foreclose when borrowers 
fell behind on their payments. On average, HOLC loans were delinquent for 
two years before foreclosure.37   
HOLC assessed the eligibility of properties for assistance by 
introducing a formal, written appraisal system that incorporated predominant 
“notions of ethnic and racial worth,” thereby advancing the interests of whites 
above that of minority communities and individuals, favoring segregation, and 
implicitly sanctioning racially discriminatory lending policies. This rating 
system was used to create color-coded residential security maps for use by real 
estate appraisers.38 This system would later influence the “underwriting 
practices of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veteran's 
Administration (VA).” The HOLC’s racial classification system was based on 
Homer Hoyt’s doctoral dissertation from the University of Chicago economics 
department. Dr. Hoyt became the HOLC’s first economist in 1933, and 
advanced to the FHA the following year to institute his discriminatory 
mortgage appraisal system into FHA’s loan guarantee criteria. 
The FHA and VA provided government insurance against losses for 
qualifying mortgage instruments.  These institutions encouraged individuals to 
borrow by extending the repayment period of insured loans to twenty-five or 
thirty years, which decreased monthly payment obligations.  The loans were 
fully amortized so that borrowers would own their homes at the end of the loan 
term, a feature designed to coincide with a 30-year working life and retirement 
at the age of 60.39  VA and FHA’s criteria for providing insurance to lenders 
operated on the premise that racial segregation was necessary to ensure the 
maintenance of property values, which furthered the exclusion of African 
Americans from the housing market. 
Adam Gordon explains that when the FHA decided to insure low-down-
payment, long-term mortgages in order to promote homeownership, “it pro-
duced underwriting guidelines based on an economically and historically flawed 
																																								 																				
36 David C. Wheelock, Government Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the 
Great Depression 15 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, Working Paper 2008-
038A, 2008), http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2008/2008-038.pdf (citing THIRD ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 600 (1935), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ 
scribd/?item_id=23534&filepath=/files/docs/publications/holc/1935_annualrpt.pdf). 
37 CLEMENT LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN 
CORPORATION 73 (1st ed. 1951). 
38 THOMAS SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN 
POSTWAR DETROIT 44 (2d ed. 2005) (reporting that, in Detroit, every African American 
neighborhood was rated “D” or “hazardous” by federal appraisers)  
39 JORDAN & HARRIS, supra note 5, at 80.  
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understanding of a ‘natural’ progression of neighborhood racial change from all-
white (with high property values) to all-black (with low property values).”40   
These guidelines rated a neighborhood’s suitability for FHA insurance based on 
racial composition: “‘A’ neighborhoods had to be ‘homogenous’—meaning 
‘American business and professional men’—and ‘American’—meaning white 
and often, native-born. Predominantly black neighborhoods received a ‘D 
grade’” under these guidelines.41 The geographic boundaries of the neighbor-
hoods in which FHA was willing to guarantee home mortgages excluded all 
black neighborhoods, and previously all-white neighborhoods that were in 
transition from white to integrated.42 Thus, private financial institutions hoping 
to qualify for FHA or VA insurance “were reluctant to provide mortgages to 
areas inhabited by prosperous African Americans, and refused to originate any 
mortgage loans to African Americans seeking to acquire property in the vicinity 
of white neighborhoods.” Racially discriminatory procedures quickly became 
standard throughout the mortgage industry, even for private individuals and 
savings and loan institutions. While private insurers might have arisen to offer 
African-Americans the opportunities denied to them by the FHA, Congress and 
state legislatures amended safety-and-soundness regulations in a way that 
disallowed competition with the FHA.43   
 
3. Credit Starvation: A Necessary Precondition to Demand for 
Subprime Loans 
 
HOLC, FHA and VA were the exclusive venues for affordable home 
mortgages.  As a result, predatory practices, including pay day loans and land 
sale contracts, surged to fill the void of government support for housing in 
																																								 																				
40 Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking 
Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for 
Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 189, 193, 208 (2005). Gordon describes a racially discriminatory 
pattern of access to government home mortgage finance based on the underwriting criteria for the 
FHA mortgage program that provided for the first timed 30 year fixed rate mortgages with down 
payments as low as 20%.  The FHA criteria were based upon the view that stable neighborhoods 
were racially homogeneous and white.  The geographic boundaries of the neighborhoods in which 
FHA was willing to guarantee home mortgages excluded all black neighborhoods, and previously 
white neighborhoods that were in transition from white to integrated. 
41 Id. at 190–209. 
42 Id. at 207-08, 216. The FHA’s underwriting manual warned appraisers of the dangers of 
infiltration of racial minorities into white neighborhoods, and encouraged the use of 
restrictive covenants as a mechanism for maintaining neighborhood stability via racial 
segregation. This recommendation remained in place until 1950, two years after the Supreme 
Court declared racial covenants unenforceable. 
43 Id. at 189. 
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redlined urban black neighborhoods. Predatory practices such as land sale 
contracts flourished.44 Thus, federal housing policy was instrumental in 
ensuring that “African-Americans were denied the opportunities to buy a 
home in developing suburban neighborhoods and to build the wealth that 
became the mainstay of the American white middle class.”45 Given that less 
than 1% of mortgages were issued to blacks between 1930 and 1960, blacks 
were frequently compelled to seek “less favorable, often predatory, forms of 
mortgage financing.”46 “Blocked from low-interest government-backed 
guaranteed loans, redlined by financial institutions, or barred from home-
ownership by restrictive covenants, black families have [long] been denied 
the benefits of housing inflation and the subsequent vast increase in home 
equity assets.”47 “[W]here blacks were prevented, often through violence, 
from owning property, or loans were not granted to African American 
business owners, or black homeowners could not access FHA mortgages, or 
blacks were excluded from unions, or the police force, or fire departments - 
meant that black families could not amass any meaningful wealth to bequeath 
to future generations. This history helps explain the wealth and income gap 
[that exists] between black and white, and the concentrated pockets of 
poverty that persist in so many of today's urban and rural communities.”48 
Blacks and other minorities were set up as easy targets for predatory lending 
by decades of exclusion from prime lending opportunities. Indeed, “African 
																																								 																				
44 See generally BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER RACE AND 
REAL ESTATE TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA (2010). 
45 Gordon, supra note 40, at 190–209. See also Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial 
Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 630 (2010). 
46 Nier, supra note 34, at 185. 
47 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 23 (1997) (“Blocked from low-interest government-
backed loans, redlined out by financial institutions, or barred from homeownership by banks, 
black families have been denied the benefits of housing inflation and the subsequent vast 
increase in home equity assets.”).  
48 Nier, supra note 34, at 132 (citations omitted). See also Spencer Overton, But Some Are 
More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1006 (2002) 
(“The racial disparity in wealth realized through home ownership and home value originally 
caused by federal housing policies has since been compounded by seemingly neutral public 
and private decisions. Because people of color are less likely to own homes, they are less 
likely to take advantage of tax provisions allowing for the deduction of a large percentage of 
their housing costs (all property taxes and mortgage interest). Further, the home values 
appreciated dramatically during the period between 1934 and the 1970s, and this increase 
benefited whites more than people of color.  Even people of color who were able to purchase 
homes were less likely than whites to benefit from increasing home values because of the 
slower rate of appreciation of property in nonwhite areas.”). 
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Americans, along with other minorities and low-income populations, have 
been the targets of the sub-prime mortgage system,”49 as targeting has 
replaced redlining as a means of financial exploitation.  
In fact, the growth of subprime lending has been disproportionately 
concentrated among African Americans and in African American neighbor-
hoods. In 1993, subprime refinancing loans accounted for just 8% of home 
loans in African American neighborhoods and 1% in white neighborhoods.  By 
1998, the number of subprime refinancing loans had dramatically increased to 
51% of the total loans in African American neighborhoods compared to only 
9% in white neighborhoods. By 2005, 52% of the total mortgage loans to 
African Americans were subprime loans, in contrast to 19% for whites. 
 
4. Bait and Switch: Financially Vulnerable Populations Take the Bait 
 
Financially vulnerable populations50—long excluded from prime 
lending opportunities and accustomed to predatory debt—historically had little 
chance to become homeowners. Earlier prime borrowers took mortgages for 
30 years, with 20% cash down payments, borrowing 80% at interest rates 
averaging about 6%.  Then, in the eleven-year period between 1994 and 2005, 
the subprime mortgage became a new product for financing the homes of 
middle- and working-class borrowers.51 Unlike the prime borrowers who 
fueled the growth of middle class wealth in the post-war years, subprime 
borrowers in the late 90’s had lower incomes, more compromised credit scores, 
and less money to make down payments on a house.  In addition, these families 
did not have the benefit of the wealth accumulated from previous home 
ownership. Most subprime borrowers required 100% financing due to limited 
incomes with no surplus for a down payment. Second, subprime loans were 
																																								 																				
49 Thomas M. Shapiro & Melvin L. Oliver, Sub-Prime as a Black Catastrophe, AM. PROSPECT 
(Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=sub_prime_as_a_black_catastrophe.  
50 The pattern of racial discrimination across many sectors of consumer transactions has been 
demonstrated with empirical methods in highly influential studies; Ian Ayres, in particular, has 
conducted and published studies that document patterns of racial discrimination across a wide 
variety of high-value consumer transactions.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and 
Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827–41 (1991) 
(demonstrating, through empirical evidence, that retail car dealerships systematically offer 
substantially better prices on identical cars to white men than to blacks or women); IAN AYRES, 
PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
(2001) (presenting evidence that blacks and women are consistently at a disadvantage in 
multiple markets, including bail bonding, kidney transplantation, and FCC licensing). 
51 GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 3 (“While all income groups have participated in this new 
opening up the mortgage market and rise in homeownership, low- and moderate- income 
households and racial and ethnic minorities have been at the center of the boom.”). 
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designed to calibrate the loan features to borrower characteristics at much 
higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the risk of default inherent in 
lending to buyers with no equity in the mortgage origination.52 
The key distinction between the prime and subprime borrower during 
the period of rapid growth of home ownership 1994–200553 is that subprime 
borrowers had lower family incomes.54 These new entrants to homeownership 
could only aspire to move from renting to home-owning when the new 
subprime mortgage products allowed them to substitute borrowing over thirty 
years for accumulated home equity from previous homes, or saving out of 
current income for the standard 10–20 percent down payment.55 
The data that follows shows that preexisting income inequalities by 
race, when combined with inequalities in accumulated housing wealth, created 
opportunities for introducing new loan products to borrowers who had pre-
viously been excluded from home ownership. The exclusion was due to not only 
the amount, sources and stability of family income but also the structural fea-
tures of government-facilitated discrimination in the home mortgage industry.56 
																																								 																				
52 Id.  See generally Rosen Richard J., The Impact of the Originate-to-Distribute Model on 
Banks Before and During the Financial Crisis (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working 
Paper No. WP-10-20, 2011). 
53 Id. at 3. Gramlich discusses the dramatic expansion of homeownership in the period 
immediately following World War II.  “The overall homeownership rate/percentage of home 
owners rose from 45% to 65% in the ten years following after the war.” See also Gordon, 
supra note 40, at 193; GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 1. Gordon describes a racially 
discriminatory pattern of access to home mortgage finance based on the underwriting criteria 
for the FHA mortgage program that first provided 30 year fixed rate mortgages with down 
payments as low as 20%.  The FHA criteria were based on the view that stable neighborhoods 
were racially homogeneous and white.  The geographic boundaries of the neighborhoods in 
which FHA was willing to guarantee home mortgages excluded all black neighborhoods, and 
previously white neighborhoods that were in transition from white to integrated. JAMES 
GREER, RACE AND MORTGAGE REDLINING IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2012). In short, 
“African Americans, along with other minorities and low-income populations, have been the 
targets of the sub-prime mortgage system.” Shapiro & Oliver, supra note 49. 
54 THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN 119 (2004). 
55 GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 1–2. 
56 Gordon, supra note 40, at 189, 207, 209, 222. Gordon explains that when the FHA decided that 
it would insure low-down-payment, long-term mortgages in order to promote homeownership, it 
“produced underwriting guidelines based on an economically and historically flawed 
understanding of a ‘natural’ progression of neighborhood racial change from all-white (with high 
property values) to all-black (with low property values).” Id. at 189. “These guidelines rated a 
neighborhood’s suitability for insurance based on racial composition . . . .” Id. 
 
The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation rated every urban and suburban 
neighborhood in America as “A,” “B,” “C,” or “D” quality, color coding 
maps of every metropolitan area (“D,” or lowest quality, was colored red—
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If we look at income measures we can see that by 2001, the beginning 
of the housing bubble in America, the nominal gap in median net household 
wealth between blacks and whites had grown from $44,000 in 1984 to $86,000 
in 2001.  This income gap helped set the stage for differences in home owner-
ship rates.57 
In addition to the effects of disparate income, as Thomas Shapiro and 
Melvin Oliver have established, the down payment deficit of lower-income 
borrowers is a direct byproduct of intergenerational wealth differences between 
blacks and whites that are attributable to the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow 
employment and residential segregation. 
Racial disparities in housing finance posed systemic financial risks 
because pre-existing income, credit, wealth, and housing ownership disparities 
between blacks and whites created virtually irresistible pools for subprime 
mortgage transactions, with scant government oversight. The Fed’s failure to 
control exploitative mortgage products combined with prevailing social 
attitudes and stubborn practices of housing segregation created a perfect storm 
that devastated the global financial community.58 The interconnectedness of 
financial institutions, both regulated and largely unregulated, provided the once-
hidden vector for spreading losses caused by the predictable defaults in segre-
gated communities to the balance sheets of investors throughout the globe. 
																																								 																				
the origin of the term “redlining”). Quality ratings were based on age and 
type of housing stock, but also very much on race. “A” neighborhoods had 
to be “homogenous”—meaning “American business and professional 
men”— and “American”—meaning white and often, native-born.99 
Predominantly black neighborhoods received a “D” grade. 
 
Id. at 207 (citations omitted). Consequently, the FHA’s underwriting criteria resulted in 
“much lower rates of lending to nonwhites than to whites.” Id. at 209. “African Americans 
were denied the opportunities to buy a home in developing suburban neighborhoods and to 
build the wealth that became the mainstay of the American white middle class.” Id. at 222.  
 
When African Americans did buy homes, usually using conventional 
mortgages, they not only tended to pay more in down payments and 
roughly the same monthly payments when compared with whites using 
FHA-insured mortgages, but they also got much lower-quality homes. 
While private insurers might have arisen to offer African-Americans the 
opportunities denied to them by the FHA, Congress and state legislatures 
amended safety-and-soundness regulations in a way that disallowed 
competition with the FHA. 
 
Id. 
57 GRAMLICH, supra note 32, at 3. “[F]rom 1994 to 2005, the overall rate rose from 64 to 69 
percent.”  Id. However, “the rate for blacks rose from 42 to 49 percent.” Id.  
58 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. AT HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF NATION’S HOUSING 17 (2008). 
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5. Mortgage Brokers Compensation: Financial Incentives for 
Racial Steering 
 
At an inner-city intersection, where globalized capital and free-market 
finance meet America's shameful history of racial segregation and subord-
ination, a new and insidious form of racial discrimination lurks. Where lending 
discrimination once took a binary form—bigoted loan officers rejecting loan 
applicants because of their skin color—the new model of discrimination is pure 
and simple exploitation. Unscrupulous lenders now take advantage of a history 
of racial redlining by aggressively marketing overpriced loan products with 
onerous terms in the same neighborhoods where mainstream lenders once 
refused to lend.  
“Conflicts of interest created by the OTD model provide the most likely 
explanation for the links between securitization, higher-risk loans and rising 
default rates.”59 Lenders earned higher fees for selling subprime loans 
packaged into private label mortgage backed securities than for selling prime 
loans packaged into GSE issued mortgage-backed securities.54 As a result, 
lenders encouraged their mortgage brokers to sell more subprime loans by 
offering larger commissions and yield-spread premiums as incentive, among 
other things.60 
During the subprime boom, many large mortgage originators restruc-
tured their commission systems so that mortgage loan officers and underwriters 
would be paid considerably higher commissions when customers purchased 
subprime loans instead of prime loans. Wells Fargo is one such mortgage 
originator.  The company adopted a commission structure that favored sub-
prime loan origination in company offices nationwide. As a result, many Wells 
Fargo loan officers earned over a half million dollars per year.61 Beth Jacobson, 
																																								 																				
59 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking:  Financial Conglomerates 
and the Origins of Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. LAW. REV. 963, 1024 (2009).  
54 Id. 
60 Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone: WaMu Built Empire on 
Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2008), https://nyti.ms/2kAYlAf (“WaMu gave mortgage 
brokers handsome commissions for selling the riskiest loans, which carried higher fees, 
bolstering profits and ultimately the compensation of the bank's executives”); Gretchen 
Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2007), 
https://nyti.ms/2k9mJIB (“The company's incentive system . . . encouraged brokers and sales 
representatives to move borrowers into the subprime category, even if their financial position 
meant that they belonged higher up the loan spectrum.”); Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 1025–
26 (2009) (discussing that lenders had incentives to promote high-risk loans, such as earning 
higher fees).  
61 Ylan Q. Mui, Ex-loan Officer Claims Wells Fargo Targeted Black Communities for 
Shoddy Loans, WASH. POST (Jun 12, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econ 
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a Baltimore loan officer for Wells Fargo “churned out roughly $50 million in 
loans annually for Wells Fargo, making her the top-producing subprime officer 
in the country. She earned as much as $700,000 one year, more than seven 
times the company’s stated average for subprime-loan officers in her area.”62   
The incentive to maximize profits led to widespread misconduct in 
mortgage origination practices by brokers throughout the industry. Prior to 
the reform measures, “consumers [paid] penalties that [made] it more 
expensive—and sometimes impossible . . . to switch out of their loans if they 
[felt] they have been given a bad deal,” giving lenders an incentive to sell 
iniquitous adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). This is perhaps why “more 
than fifty-seven percent of the subprime loans granted in 2006 are in 
foreclosure or pre-foreclosure.”63 Brokers disproportionally targeted African-
Americans with adjustable rate mortgages.64  
In her sworn affidavit, Beth Jacobson, a Baltimore-based former 
employee of Wells Fargo, described a work environment in which officers 
often used dishonesty and fraud to shift customers into subprime products. Ms. 
Jacobson reported that colleagues “falsified loan applications in order to [steer 
prime borrowers to] subprime loans,” sometimes cutting and pasting credit 
reports for one customer onto another's application, or falsely claiming that the 
applicant did not wish to provide documentation to override computer 
restrictions on subprime loan allocations.65 
Another Wells Fargo employee, Mr. Tony Paschal, reported in his 
affidavit that when computer software flagged subprime loans going to what 
should have been prime customers, underwriters would enter one of a number 
of “stock responses,” including “customer has no assets,” to override the 
																																								 																				
omy/former-wells-fargo-loan-officer-testifies-in-baltimore-mortgage-lawsuit/2012/06/12/g 
JQA6EGtXV_story.html.  
62 Id. 
63 Chris Levister, Landmark Financial Overhaul Will Protect African Americans, BLACK 
VOICE NEWS (Jul. 24, 2010), http://newamericamedia.org/2010/07/landmark-financial-over 
haul-will-protect-african-americans.php. 
64 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR AND UNSAFE: HOW COUNTRYWIDE’S 
IRRESPONSIBLE PRACTICES HAVE HARMED BORROWERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2 (2008) 
(stating that borrowers and regulators have accused Countrywide of engaging in: “steering 
borrowers with good credit into higher-cost “subprime” loans; gouging minority borrowers 
with discriminatory rates and fees; working in cahoots with mortgage brokers who use bait-
and-switch tactics to land borrowers into loans they can’t afford; targeting elderly and non-
English-speaking borrowers for abusive loans; and packing loans with inflated and unauth-
orized fees”).  
65 Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider, Baltimore v. Wells Fargo (D. Md. June 29, 2009) (No. 
1:08-cv-00062-BEL), at *22 (copies of docket court filings are on file with Journal of Law 
& Public Affairs).  
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system and approve the loan. Loans to minority borrowers were the centerpiece 
of the subprime loan fee maximizing strategy. Mr. Paschal remarked that the 
bank put “bounties” on minority customers, offering cash incentives to 
employees who aggressively marketed subprime loans in minority comm-
unities. Wells Fargo encouraged its loan officer to push subprime loans in black 
churches and to conduct seminars in minority neighborhoods.66 For instance, 
the Wells Fargo office in Silver Spring, Maryland, created an Affinity Group 
consisting entirely of African American employees whose job was to target 
African Americans and African American churches. Employees began to refer 
to minority customers as “mud people,” and the subprime loans made to them 
as “ghetto loans.”67  
Studies disclose that a black homebuyer, “even in upper-income 
African-American neighborhoods . . . is one-and-a-half times as likely to have a 
subprime loan as persons in low-income white neighborhoods.”68 “[T]he Federal 
Reserve found that African Americans—especially black women—were two to 
three times more likely to be steered into costly subprime mortgages, even when 
they had good credit[.]”69 Additionally, “when these consumers tried to get out 
of high-rate loans, they often couldn't because the loans had balloon payments 
or were packed with expensive prepayment penalties.”70  
In the years leading up to the financial meltdown, more than half of the 
loans granted to African Americans were subprime. In fact, African Americans 
“were three times more likely to receive higher-priced loans than whites.”71  
																																								 																				
66 Id. at 17.  
67 PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE 
MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 64–69, 82–87, 120–25, 263–65 (2008). 
68 MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, EVERYDAY LAW FOR CONSUMERS (2015). 
69 Lynette Khalfani-Cox, Study Shows Dramatic Decrease in Mortgage Loans to Minorities, 
THE GRIOT (Feb. 16, 2011), http://thegrio.com/2011/02/16/study-shows-dramatic-decrease-
in-mortgage-loans-to-minorities/. See also ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, 
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., WOMEN ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR SUBPRIME LENDING: WOMEN 
ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY REPRESENTED IN HIGH-COST MORTGAGE MARKET 4 (2006) 
(“Women are more likely to receive subprime mortgages than men of the same race and 
women of color are much more likely to receive subprime mortgages than white men.”).  
70 Lynette Khalfani-Cox, The President’s Financial Reform & African Americans; TONY 
BARD WRITE: DESTINATIONS (Jul. 22, 2010) http://tonybardwrite.blogspot.com/2010/07/ 
financial-reform-and-african-americans.html. See generally Roberto G. Quercia et al., The 
Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of 
Prepayment Penalties & Balloon Payments, 21 CORNELL J. OF LAW AND PUB. POL’Y 247, 
255 (2007) (“[R]efinance loans with prepayment penalties are 20% more likely to experience 
a foreclosure, and loans with balloon payments are about 50% more likely to do so.”). 
71 Alexander J. Chenault, New Financial Regulation Reform: A Good Measure for African 
Americans, 33 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 123, 134-35 (2011). See generally DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REACHES SETTLEMENT WITH WELLS FARGO RESULTING IN 
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6. Securitization: Boomerang Contracts and the Paradox of Financial 
Engineering (the Originate-To-Distribute Model72) 
 
Traditional mortgages were issued by bankers in green eyeshades.  
Mortgages stayed on bank balance sheets.  As such, community bankers care-
fully scrutinized the credit worthiness of each individual borrower in order to 
ensure that their investment was ultimately profitable.  Portfolio lenders approv-
ed home mortgages based on ability to repay and full documentation, and then, 
only if the borrower had accumulated a twenty percent cash down payment. 
Securitization allowed banks to convert illiquid mortgages into asset-
backed securities (ABS) that could be sold to investors through capital markets. 
This allowed banks to reduce their reliance on deposits for funding to make 
loans. Notably, banks were able to move loans off their balance sheets and 
thereby reduce their regulatory capital requirements through securitization of 
their mortgage holdings. Notes Arthur Wilmarth, Jr., “Securitization offered at 
least three additional benefits to lenders. First, banks with less than a ‘AAA’ 
credit rating could use securitizations to create ABS that qualified for ‘AAA’-
ratings. Second, banks earned substantial fees for originating and securitizing 
loans and could earn additional fees by servicing the loans held in securitized 
pools. Third, securitization permitted banks to transfer to investors much of the 
credit risk associated with the securitized loans.”73 Thus, a bank that originated 
a loan that it securitized and sold to investors on the secondary market would 
be insulated from financial harm in the event of default by the borrower. In a 
2011 report, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted that the oppor-
tunity for increased profits created by securitization incentivized banks to 
originate and distribute as many loans as possible. The corresponding insul-
ation from risk simultaneously removed the incentive to ensure the long-term 
profitability of mortgage products, creating what some have referred to as the 
conditions of a perfect storm.74 
																																								 																				
MORE THAN $175 MILLION IN RELIEF FOR HOMEOWNERS TO RESOLVE FAIR LENDING 
CLAIMS (2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-wells-
fargo-resulting-more-175-million-relief (“The Department of Justice . . . filed the second 
largest fair lending settlement in the department’s history to resolve allegations that Wells 
Fargo . . . engaged in a pattern of discrimination against qualified African-American and 
Hispanic borrowers in its mortgage lending . . . .”).  
72 See DAVID MARSTON ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL 
INTERCONNECTEDNESS 5 (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/10 
0410.pdf [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS] (illustrating 
global interconnections and risk concentrations in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis).   
73 Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 985. 
74 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 3. 
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Financial Institutions adopted the originate to distribute (OTD) 
business model “in order to (i) maximize fee income, (ii) reduce their capital 
charges, and (iii) transfer to investors (at least ostensibly) the risks associated 
with securitized loans and structured-finance products.” At the largest of these 
financial institutions, fees were collected at every stage of the OTD process, 
and represented 76% of total earnings by 2007.75 
The originate-to-distribute model cut the traditional link of reciprocal 
accountability between borrower and lender.  The effect was the opposite.  
Instead of distance and separation, the new products created greater enmesh-
ment; an unintended dependence among investors and between lenders and 
borrowers. “[A]s large financial conglomerates pursued similar OTD and fee-
maximizing strategies, their collective exposures to financial risks-including 
credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk and systemic risk increased dramatically.”76 
The emerging system of shadow banking through unregulated off 
balance sheet financial institutions created bonds of international balance sheet 
linkage that were invisible before the financial crisis revealed these crucial 
linkages based on complex financial engineering.77 
 
7. Boomerang Contracts and the Paradox of Financial Engineering 
 
Several studies have confirmed that there is a strong linkage between 
increased levels of securitization and increasingly risky lending behavior 
among financial institutions. For example, one study found that if lenders in a 
particular community used securitization to sell a higher percentage of their 
loans after origination, that community would receive higher risk subprime 
mortgages and record higher default and foreclosure rates. The “securitized 
share of nonprime loans increased significantly between 2001 and 2006, during 
the same period when lending standards were declining.”78  
Antje Berndt and Anurag Gupta examine and compare the long run 
performance of borrowers where there is an active secondary market for the 
loans and those where there is no such market.79 They explain that moral 
hazard and adverse selection play a significant role in determining the riskiness 
of bank lending. The banks’ superior information about the credit quality of 
																																								 																				
75 Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 995. Perhaps most importantly, the OTD approach also offered 
financial conglomerates the apparent benefit of shifting to investors the risks associated with 
securitized loans and other structured finance products.  
76 Id. at 996.  
77 See generally UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 72. 
78 Id. at 1024. 
79 Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the Originate-to-
Distribute Model of Bank Credit, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 725, 728 (2009). 
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their loans gave rise to “adverse selection,” whereby banks sell off loans about 
which they have negative private information. Berndt and Gupta assert that 
banks originate “lemons” in order to “expand their origination-fee-based 
income, since they are able to sell these loans, relatively easily in the secondary 
market to outside investors . . . .”80 
Additionally, banks that sell loans would have a reduced incentive to 
engage in costly screening and monitoring of the borrowers about whom they 
have negative private information, since the lending relationship is ultimately 
severed.81 Also, when the “borrowers lose the discipline of lender monitor-
ing, they may be more prone to making suboptimal investment and operating 
decisions, which leads to their negative long-run performance and value 
destruction.” 
As the securitized share of nonprime lending increased, lending 
standards deteriorated. Financial institutions offered more subprime mort-
gages, which required low initial payments and much higher payments after 
their introductory teaser interest and payment rates expired. When interest 
rates of these adjustable rate mortgages were reset, borrowers experienced 
payment shock.   
In general, borrowers who entered these subprime loan contracts would 
be in danger of default if they could not refinance their mortgages before teaser 
rates expired—an option available only as long as housing prices continued to 
increase.82 When housing prices stagnated in 2006 and began to decrease in 
2007, these borrowers could no longer refinance. The Ponzi scheme of housing 
finance became unsustainable when borrowers could no longer take out new 
loans to pay off old ones, resulting in an explosion of defaults and foreclosures, 
and ultimately, the financial crisis.83 
																																								 																				
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 727. Especially true because of rapid exhaustion of prime borrower pools that have 
resources to afford down payments once securitization becomes possible “with enormous 
fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the mortgage broker 
selling the loans, to small banks that funded the brokers, to the giant investment banks behind 
them. By approximately 2003, the supply of mortgages originated at traditional lending 
standards had been exhausted. However, continued strong demand for MBS and CDO began 
to drive down lending standards, as long as mortgages could still be sold along the supply 
chain. Eventually, this speculative bubble proved unsustainable.” DONALD RAPP, BUBBLES, 
BOOMS, AND BUSTS: THE RISE AND FALL OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 290 (2d ed. 2014); see also 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 11.  
82 While the housing boom lasted, many nonprime borrowers refinanced their loans (several 
times, in some cases) by taking out new ARMs with similar teaser rate and interest escalation 
features. Wilmarth, supra note 59, at 1021–24. 
83 Id. at 970. 
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8. Data Brokers and the New Efficiency of Discriminatory Lending 
 
Privacy advocates have encouraged improved government regulation of 
the data broker84 industry in recent years, particularly with regard to the role of 
data brokers in facilitating the data driven marketing strategies in various 
business sectors. Due to mounting concern, both the US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Senate Commerce Committee have 
recently released reports detailing the results of their investigations into data 
broker industry practices.85 
The Senate Commerce Committee report, released on December 18, 
2013, focused on determining what consumer data the data broker industry 
collects; how specific this data is; how the data broker industry obtains 
consumer data; who buys this data; and how is it used. The Committee 
concluded that government regulations have lagged behind the technological 
advancements that have served to exponentially increase the availability of 
various types of consumer information.  Notably, the Committee found that data 
brokers routinely compile and sell consumer profiles in which consumers are 
categorized and scored according to their degree of “financial vulnerability.” 
The Committee found that: 
 
A number of these products focus on consumers’ financial 
vulnerability, carrying titles such as “Rural and Barely 
Making It,” “Ethnic Second-City Strugglers,” “Retiring on 
Empty: Singles,” “Tough Start: Young Single Parents,” and 
“Credit Crunched: City Families.”86 One company reviewed, 
sells a marketing tool that helps to “identify and more effect-
ively market to under-banked consumers” that the company 
describes as individuals including “widows” and “consumers 
with transitory lifestyles, such as military personnel” who 
																																								 																				
84 The Commerce Committee report adopted a broad definition of "data broker" developed 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC): "[c]ompanies that collect information, including 
personal information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of 
reselling such information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an 
individual's identity, differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial 
fraud[.]” FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUN-
TABILITY i (2014). 
85 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-663, INFORMATION 
RESELLERS: CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE MARKETPLACE (2013). 
86 What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It? Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 113th Cong. 2 (2013). 
Vol. 2:1]   The Hidden Structures of Inequality 
 
 
129 
annually spend millions on payday loans and other “non-
traditional” financial products. The names, descriptions and 
characterizations in such products likely appeal to companies 
that sell high-cost loans and other financially risky products to 
populations more likely to need quick cash, and the sale and 
use of these consumer profiles merits close review . . . .87 
 
It is now beyond dispute that predatory businesses, including some 
originators of subprime mortgages, used consumer profiles to target vulnerable 
populations, who are, as previously discussed, disproportionately consumers 
of color. For instance, according to the Senate Committee Report, “In October 
of 2012, the FTC alleged that the credit reporting division of Equifax 
improperly sold more than 17,000 ‘prescreened’ lists of consumers who were 
late on their mortgage payments to Direct Lending Source, Inc. and its affiliate 
companies.88 Direct Lending subsequently resold some of these lists to third 
parties, who “used the lists to pitch loan modification and debt relief services 
to people in financial distress, including to companies that had been the subject 
of prior law enforcement investigations.”89 
Many scholars have attributed the systemic failure of the US housing 
market to the inability of financially vulnerable consumers to refinance or 
make good on ballooning debt obligations. We know now that these finan-
cially vulnerable individuals, disproportionately racial minorities that have 
suffered historical exclusion from the prime credit market, were intentionally 
targeted by predatory businesses, often through information garnered from 
data brokers.  
This evidence begs the question: absent a history of racial discrim-
ination in housing that created an easily identifiable population of financially 
vulnerable minorities, would the subprime industry have flourished as it did?  
Also, if subprime loans had been pushed onto more vulnerable whites, or onto 
financially capable whites, would their political capital have effected a more 
robust effort to stomp out predatory lending activities before the flame began 
to burn out of control? 
																																								 																				
87 OFF. OF OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS MAJORITY STAFF, A REVIEW OF THE DATA 
BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING 
PURPOSES i-ii (2013) (Staff Report for Chairman Rockefeller). 
88 Id. at 7. 
89 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlements Require Equifax to Forfeit Money 
Made by Allegedly Improperly Selling Information About Millions of Consumers Who 
Were Late on Their Mortgages: In Separate Actions, Equifax and Its Customers Will Pay a 
Total of $1.6 Million (Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with the Federal Trade Commission). 
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9. Statistical Evidence of Racial Bias in Home Finance Markets  
 
Douglas Massey is one of the preeminent demographers of national 
patterns of residential segregation. In a study of the relationship between racial 
segregation and the foreclosure crisis,90 Massey and his doctoral student, Jacob 
Rugh, concluded that the rise in subprime lending and the ensuing wave of 
foreclosures was partly a result of market forces that have been well-identified 
in the literature, but it was also a highly racialized process. They argue that 
residential segregation created a unique niche of minority clients who were 
differentially marketed risky subprime loans that were in great demand for use 
in mortgage-backed securities that could be sold on secondary markets. Rugh 
and Massey tested this argument by regressing foreclosure actions in the top 
100 US metropolitan areas on measures of black, Hispanic, and Asian segre-
gation while controlling for a variety of housing market conditions, including 
average creditworthiness, the extent of coverage under the Community 
Reinvestment Act, the degree of zoning regulation, and the overall rate of 
subprime lending. They found that black residential dissimilarity and spatial 
isolation are powerful predictors of foreclosures across US metropolitan areas.91  
 
B. Wealth Trends: The Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, and  
Wealth Inequality 
 
1. Wealth Inequality 
 
Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty have created the definitive data-
base for analysing income inequality and wealth for 20 countries over a period 
of 100 years. 
Piketty introduced his influential research and inequality arguments, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century, with a blunt recognition: “Although the 
American Revolution established the republican principle, it allowed slavery 
to continue for nearly a century and legal racial discrimination for nearly two 
centuries. The race question still has a disproportionate influence on the social 
question in the United States today.”92 For Piketty, “The history of the distri-
																																								 																				
90 Rugh & Massey, supra note 45, at 630. 
91 See id. at 629 (“To isolate subprime lending as the causal mechanism through which 
segregation influences foreclosures, we estimate a two-stage least squares model that 
confirms the causal effect of black segregation on the number and rate of foreclosures across 
metropolitan areas. We thus conclude that segregation was an important contributing cause 
of the foreclosure crisis, along with overbuilding, risky lending practices, lax regulation, and 
the bursting of the housing price bubble.”). 
92 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30 (2014). 
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bution of wealth has always been deeply political, and it cannot be reduced to 
purely economic mechanisms . . . the resurgence of inequality after 1980 is due 
largely to the political shifts of the past several decades, especially in regard to 
taxation and finance.”93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
93  Id. at 20. 
 
Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 29 (2014). 
	
Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 33 (2014). 
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When we think of inequality, we often think of income inequality, 
which has increased markedly in the past decades, with the Gini94 coefficient 
																																								 																				
94 The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expendi-
ture among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. WORLD BANK, GINI INDEX, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. 
Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 43 (2014). 
	
Source: EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
US WEALTH, CAPITAL INCOME AND RETURNS SINCE 1913 30 (2014). 
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rising from 38.6 in 1967 to 46.8 in 2009.95 However, that increase actually 
understates the extent of the inequality in the US economy. In fact, wealth is 
far less equally distributed than income. That has always been true, but the 
disparities have been seriously exacerbated by the recent recession. This gap is 
particularly visible when examined along racial identity categories.  
Whites and Asians started with high net worth, while Blacks and 
Hispanics started with low net worth. Accordingly, among the latter two groups, 
the decline, though small in absolute terms, was nonetheless more financially 
damaging than the corresponding decline in the former two, leaving Blacks and 
Hispanics with 2009 median net worth of $5,677 and $6,325 respectively. By 
comparison, white households had a median net wealth of $113,149.96 
Most of the decline is attributable to losses sustained on real estate. This 
is especially true for Hispanic and Asian populations, which tended to be 
concentrated in areas particularly hard-hit by the decline in the real estate 
market. 83% of the decline in White median net worth was attributable to real 
estate, compared with 96% for Hispanics, 90% for Blacks, and 92.5% for 
Asians. Indeed, looking strictly at median home equity, Hispanics lost 51%, 
Asians 32%, Blacks 23%, and Whites 18%.97 
Furthermore, Black and Hispanic populations hold a far higher 
percentage of net wealth in the form of real estate. Over 80% of Whites and 
Asians hold financial assets, compared with only 60% of Blacks and Hispanics. 
A substantial disparity exists across all types of financial holdings as well.  
Looking at stocks and mutual funds, we see that between 2005 and 2009 
Hispanics lost 32% of portfolio value, Blacks an alarmingly high 71%, and 
Whites 9%. Asians actually gained 19%. In considering these figures, it should 
be remembered that in 2005, only 8% of Hispanics and 9% of Blacks had stock 
or mutual fund holdings, compared with 31% of Whites and 29% of Asians. In 
2009, the numbers had fallen to 5%, 7%, 27%, and 24% respectively.98 
To get a sense of both the starting scale of the disparities and the levels 
to which they have risen, consider the ratios of median net wealth. In 1995, 
White households were worth approximately 7 times as much as Black house-
holds. By 2004, that ratio had risen to 11. By 2009, it was 19, the highest ever 
recorded. Hispanic households held constant at a ratio of 7 from 1996 through 
																																								 																				
95 See LANE KENWORTHY & TIMOTHY SMEEDING, GINI GROWING INEQUALITIES’ IMPACTS: 
GROWING INEQUALITIES AND THEIR IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2013) (using an analysis 
“series [to] show steadily increasing inequality, with some cyclical fluctuation [and] changes in 
household size have had a small effect on income inequality in the United States as the lines do 
grow closer together (though changes in family structure might have had a larger impact . . . .”). 
96 KOCHHAR, FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 1. 
97 Id. at 18. 
98 Id. at 22. 
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2004. By 2009, however, the ratio had increased to 15. Asian house-holds were 
worth 125% of White households in 2005, but fell to 69% in 2009.99  
Not only was the recession not felt equally among demographic 
groups—it was not felt equally within those groups. Declines in net worth 
occurred among both the richest and the poorest, but within all groups, the 
percentage of households with zero or negative net worth increased markedly, 
rising 36% among Whites, 35% among Hispanics, 21% among Blacks, and 
58% among Asians. 
By comparison, for wealthier households, although the overall 90th 
percentile of net worth fell by 7% between 2005 and 2009, their share of 
national wealth rose from 49% to 56%. Within the demographic groups, 
Whites saw the smallest increase, with ownership share rising from 46% to 
51%, while Asians rose from 44% to 61%, Blacks from 59% to 67%, and 
Hispanics from 56% to 72%. 
 
2. Income Inequality Trends  
 
In addition to the wealth inequality picture discussed above, a 2016 study 
demonstrates that income data too reinforces the portrait of increased wealth 
inequality with a portrait of the highest wage earners pulling away from the rest.100  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
99 Id.  
100 See generally Elise Gould, Wage Inequality Continued its 35-year rise in 2015 (Econ. Policy 
Inst., Briefing Paper #421, 2016), http://www.epi.org/files/2016/wage-inequality-2015.pdf.  
Source: Elise Gould, infra note 100. 
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 The dramatic segmentation we see between the highest wealth holders 
and the rest is also reflected in data showing that the income of the highest wage 
earners is growing faster than the lowest wage earners.  This trend reflects the 
higher wages earned by men.101 Gould shows “that the top 1 percent grew 149.4 
percent, while the bottom 90 percent grew only 16.7 percent since 1979.”102 
Thomas Piketty sees danger in the forces of divergence when “top 
earners can quickly separate themselves from the rest by a wide margin. More 
important, there is a set of forces of divergence associated with the process of 
accumulation and concentration of wealth when growth is weak and the return 
on capital is high. Piketty concludes that the divergence arising from accum-
ulation and concentration of wealth is potentially more destabilizing, and 
represents the principal threat to equal distribution of wealth over the long run.103   
This portrait of accumulating wealth inequality and wage inequality 
provide a dismal landscape of insurmountable, perpetual advantage to some 
and perpetual disadvantage to others.  When income becomes wealth, and 
wealth can be translated into political power to shape the very rules of 
engagement in markets without boundaries or limits, a disturbing portrait of 
democratic instability emerges.   
The Federal Reserve decision to exercise its statutory emergency 
powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to provide never-
before-seen infusions of liquidity to the unregulated financial sector that caused 
the crisis without any public- regarding conditions placed on this cash transfer 
constituted a massive redistribution of wealth to the financial sector away from 
taxpayers and homeowners.   
 
3. Political Capital: The Wealth Advantage in Writing the 
Financial Rules 
 
Existing frameworks fail to acknowledge that various forms of past 
state-mandated discrimination against racial minorities have shaped the current 
distribution of wealth and property, which in turn keep many people of color 
from participating fully in a privately financed political system. By using the 
First Amendment to undermine legislative restrictions on political contribu-
tions in cases like Citizens United,104 the courts effectively enshrine the 
existing distribution of wealth as a baseline for political advantage. 
																																								 																				
101 Id. at 3.  
102 Id. at 7 (citing Lawrence Mishel & Will Kimball, Wages for Top Earners Soared in 2014: 
Fly Top 0.1 Percent, Fly, WORKING ECON. (Nov. 3, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://www.epi.org/ 
blog/wages-for-top-earners-soared-in-2014-fly-top-0-1-percent-fly/). 
103 PIKETTY, supra note 92, at 23. 
104 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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While income represents earnings in a particular year, wealth repre-
sents in part the accumulation of income over long periods of time. Wealthy 
people, including people who earn no income but have inherited a great deal 
of wealth, control significant resources that they may use to participate in the 
current campaign finance process. Further, wealth affords opportunities that 
significantly shape one’s future income and the income of one’s offspring. 
Wealth is a “resource available for improving life chances, providing further 
opportunities, securing prestige, passing status along to one’s family, and 
influencing the political process.” As indicated above, racial disparities in 
wealth and net worth are much broader than racial disparities in income. In 
1995, the median net worth for white households ($61,000) was over eight 
times greater than for African American households ($7400) and over twelve 
times greater than for Latino households ($5000). In the campaign finance 
context, net worth is germane because a family with a high net worth 
presumably has fewer obligations and more disposable resources to spend on 
politics. In other words, it has political capital. 
The existing campaign finance system is a structural device that works 
to perpetuate racial disparities. Privately financed politics, framed by a history 
of racially discriminatory laws that have contributed to a present-day disparity 
in control over resources, reproduce and exacerbate racial disparities in the 
distribution of resources and political influence. These increasing disparities, 
combined with numerical minority status, make people of color especially 
vulnerable in the current political system. Raskin and Bonifaz criticize the 
existing campaign finance system not only for the inequitable access it 
provides to potential candidates and voters but also for the structural bias in 
government decision making that results. 
Then there is the matter of the wealth accruing to the financial sector, 
which creates a synergistic political advantage in obtaining favorable legal 
rules that aggravate the national inequality problem. We see the growing 
dominance of the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector in its 
political contributions. FIRE has been the most prolific contributor to cam-
paigns over the past 20 years. Since 1989, national senatorial candidates have 
received a total of $431 million from the FIRE sector.105  
In the 10 years leading up to the current economic crisis, the financial 
sector spent $5 billion on political influence, according to a report by the 
Essential Information and Consumer Education Foundation. From 1998 to 
																																								 																				
105  Paul Blumenthal, Senate Democrats, Republicans Raced to Raise Money from Finance, 
Insurance, Real Estate Sector in 2009, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 13, 2010, 4:09 PM) 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/04/13/senate-democrats-republicans-raced-to-
raise-money-from-finance-insurance-real-estate-sector-in-2009/.  
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2008, investment firms, commercial banks, hedge funds, real estate companies, 
and insurance companies spent $1.725 billion on political contributions and 
$3.4 billion on lobbyists.106 
Much of the implementation of financial reform occurs at the agency 
level under a Chevron107 deference standard that allows agencies wide latitude 
to interpret statutes. Two significant Supreme Court campaign finance decisions, 
Citizens United108 and McCutcheon,109 make the agency implementation 
process especially vulnerable to the inevitable loophole industry dispensing 
political contributions to change the rules or eliminate regulation altogether. 
 
a. Financial Regulatory Arbitrage: Evidence of the Wealth 
Advantage of the Financial Sector 
. 
The recent financial crisis hollowed out the core of American middle-
class financial stability. In the wake of the financial crisis, household net worth 
in the United States fell by 24%, for a loss of $16 trillion. Moreover, retirement 
accounts, the largest class of financial assets, saw a steep drop in value, as did 
house prices.  These two classes of assets alone represent approximately 43% of 
all household wealth. The losses during the principal crisis years, from 2007 to 
2009, were devastating, “erasing almost two decades of accumulated prosper-
ity,” in the words of the Federal Reserve itself.110 Beyond these direct household 
balance-sheet losses, one out of every four homeowners were underwater by 
2009 with mortgages worth less than the value of their homes. If we add in the 
3.7 to 5 million foreclosures that forced Americans to move from the economic 
and emotional stability of family homes, we see a portrait of dramatic financial 
instability in the wake of the financial collapse. What’s more, the Federal 
Reserve’s commitment to low interest rates, so beloved on Wall Street,111 has 
prevented many families from rebuilding their wealth through interest on 
savings. These “zero-bound” interest rates are an impediment to middle-class 
recovery from the losses of the crisis.  
																																								 																				
106  Paul Blumenthal, Financial Sector Spent $5 Billion on Political Influence, SUNLIGHT 
FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2009, 3:05PM) http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2009/03/04/financial-
secotr-spent-5-billion-on-political-influence/. 
107  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844  (1984). 
108  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315 (2010). 
109  McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1437 (2014). 
110 Binyamin Appelbaum, Family Net Worth Drops to Level of Early ‘90s, Fed Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2012, https://nyti.ms/2kASpXW. 
111  See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Low Interest Rates Help Private- Equity Moguls and Hurt 
Average Americans, NATION (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/low-interest-
rates-help-private-equity-moguls-and-hurt-average-americans/ (explaining Wall Street investors’ 
affinity for near-zero rates). 
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By contrast, the financial sector—the cause of the crisis—has pros-
pered from adversity, growing to 9% of GDP by 2010 even as it has become 
less efficient.112 This percentage is one of the highest shares of GDP in the past 
half century and represents 29% of all profits in America.113 The financial 
sector earns profits by pooling funds to bring net savers together with net 
borrowers in financial contracts, a process known as intermediation.  
Economist Thomas Philippon, of New York University, found that the 
profits from intermediation grew from less than 2% of GDP in 1870 to nearly 
6% before the economic crash of 1929.114 After World War II, financiers 
gradually increased their share of the economy to 5% by 1980, close to what it 
had been before the crash. The focused deregulatory agenda of the Reagan 
administration and Alan Greenspan’s deregulatory passions at the helm of the 
Fed from 1987 to 2006 swelled the balance sheets of financial firms to the high 
point of 9% of GDP by 2010.115  Philippon writes: 
 
[Today’s] trading activities are at least three times larger than at 
any time in history, and though trading costs have decreased, the 
costs of active fund management are large . . . . [I]nvestors spend 
0.67% of asset value trying (in vain, by definition) to beat the 
market. 
 
In the absence of evidence that increased trading led to either 
better prices or better risk sharing, I must conclude that the 
finance industry’s share of GDP is about two percentage points 
higher than it needs to be and that this represents an annual 
misallocation of resources of about $280 billion for the United 
States alone.116  
																																								 																				
112 Thomas Philippon, Finance vs. Wal-Mart: Why are Financial Services so Expensive?, in 
RETHINKING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 235, 235 (Alan S. Binder et al., eds., 2012). 
113 Kathleen Madigan, Like the Phoenix, U.S. Finance Profits Soar, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2011, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/03/25/like-the-phoenix-u-s-finance-profits-soar. 
114 Philippon, supra note 112, at 236. 
115  See id. (“The cost of intermediation . . . shrinks to less than 4% in 1950, grows slowly to 
5% in 1980, and then increases rapidly to almost 9% in 2010.”). 
116 Id. at 245 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).  The return to investors did not match 
the growth in the financial sector’s share of GDP. So what did investors get for their money? 
According to Philippon’s findings, it is impossible to beat the market in part because of high-
frequency trading that locks out the ordinary investor through sophisticated high-speed computer 
transmission of orders with preferential cable and algorithmic access to the trading desks. See 
generally Benjamin Landy, Graph: How the Financial Sector Consumed America’s Economic 
Growth, CENTURY FOUNDATION (Feb. 25, 2013), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/graph-how-
the-financial-sector-consumed-americas-economic-growth/. 
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The return to investors did not match the growth in the financial sector’s 
share of GDP. So what did investors get for their money? Philippon says it’s 
impossible to beat the market in part because of high-frequency trading that locks 
out the ordinary investor through sophisticated high-speed computer transmis-
sion of orders with preferential cable and algorithmic access to the trading desks. 
Eric Gerding provides a persuasive account of the relationship between 
boom and bust cycles in financial markets and regulatory arbitrage frenzies.117 
Gerding argues that as bubbles form, there is increasing pressure on regulators 
to deregulate financial markets, reduce enforcement initiatives, repeal or water 
down regulations, and refuse to apply legal rules to financial innovations.118 
Financial market actors seek “regulatory stimulus” to extend the profitable run-
up of the boom cycle through the relaxation of government oversight. This cycle, 
Gerding argues, creates “regulatory instability.”119 In his account, the effect-
iveness of government oversight of financial markets decreases notably during 
a bubble as regulators are besieged by lobbyists and industry advocates. The 
sophisticated gaming of the rules begins in earnest when the wealth created by 
the bubble makes it profitable to engage in creative risk-taking that skirts the law. 
Financial regulatory arbitrage became a “blood sport” during the crisis, 
according to Arthur Levitt, Former Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chairman.120 Levitt describes the harassment campaigns to which agencies 
with rigorous enforcement priorities were subjected: 
 
“[O]nce word of a proposed regulation got out, industry lobbyists 
would rush to complain to members of the congressional comm-
ittee with jurisdiction over the financial activity at issue.”121  
 
According to Levitt, these members would then “harass” the SEC with 
frequent letters demanding answers to complex questions and appearances of 
officials before Congress.122 These requests consumed much of the agency’s 
time and discouraged it from making regulations. Levitt described it as “kind 
of a blood sport to make the particular agency look stupid or inept or venal.”123 
																																								 																				
117  ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 236–75 (2014). 
118  Id. at 276-301. 
119  Id. 
120 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 53. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. See, e.g., Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Harsh Words for Regulators, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/harsh-words-for-
regulators-in-crisis-commission-report/ (describing how the Congressional commission har-
shly criticized various regulatory agencies and blamed them for the financial crisis). 
123 Id. at 53.  
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Regulatory arbitrage is alive and well. On June 8, 2017, the House of 
Representatives passed the Financial Choice Act to repeal major provisions of 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank reforms.124 One provision essentially eliminates the 
political autonomy of the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
by making the position subject to presidential appointment and removal.125 
Another provision allows larger banks to exchange higher financial cushion 
levels in exchange for elimination of several Dodd Frank regulations, such as 
reducing the number of mandatory “stress tests” to predict whether they could 
withstand extreme economic conditions without taxpayer bailouts.126 
 
b. A Case Study of TruPS: Arbitrage Frenzy Continued 
Even After the Crisis 
 
The case of regulatory treatment of Trust Preferred Securities (TruPS) 
is one important and highly profitable example of a sophisticated game of 
financial regulatory arbitrage. These hybrid debt securities were used to dilute 
the capital of bank holding companies (BHCs).  After the crisis, the FDIC 
found that banking organizations issuing TruPS failed at much higher rates 
during the period of January 1, 2008 through November 5, 2010 than did 
insured banks generally or insured banks in BHCs that did not issue TruPS. 
The Fed approved this capital dilution strategy; the FDIC strenuously opposed 
its use.127 
To carry out this strategy, the BHC would set up a special purpose entity 
(SPE) as a subsidiary that held only the junior subordinated debt (debenture) 
issued by the BHC to the SPE. The SPE then issued common stock and TruPS. 
The common stock was bought entirely by the BHC128 and the TruPS were sold 
to investors.  The cash raised from investors was then borrowed by the BHC, 
with the debenture in the SPE, a long term subordinated note, provided in 
exchange for the cash.  The BHC paid interest on the debenture. The interest 
payments were tax deductible as a debt payment for tax purposes.    
																																								 																				
124 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/115/ 
bills/hr10/BILLS-115hr10eh.pdf; Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd-Frank Banking 
Rules Passes in House, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 8, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2sWGNlz. 
125 Rappeport, supra note 124. 
126 Id. 
127 Letter from Donald E. Powell to Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. 3-9 (July 2, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Powell Letter] (providing, on 
behalf of the FDIC, strong objections to treating trust preferred securities as Tier 1 capital). 
128 This accounting trick allows the TruPS to be treated as a minority interest of the BHC and 
consolidate the balance sheet of the subsidiary SPE and count it as Tier 1 capital. Powell 
Letter, supra note 127, at 2; Todd H. Eveson, Financial and Banking Holding Company 
Issuance of Trust Preferred Securities, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 315, 323–329 (2002). 
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The debt issued by the BHC was in the form of a debenture. Filed under 
the Securities Act of 1933, most of them fell under the exception of 
registration.129 For the regulatory arbitrage to work, the features of the 
debenture had to mimic the characteristic of common equity: unsecured, 
subordinated to the rights of other creditors, with long maturities (30 years) and 
long periods of deferral. Accordingly, the TruPS issued by the SPE had to be 
exactly equal to the aggregate face value of the BHC debentures it held. It also 
mirrored the terms (frequency, amount) of the debentures so that interest 
payments on the debentures received by the trust were immediately declared 
as a dividend to the holders of the trust. The SPE did nothing to the funds that 
flowed into it other than pass them through to its security holders.130 
																																								 																				
129  “Because of the 144A status of TruPS CDOs, however, trustees do not allow Intex to 
make all information available to analysts as they do with public deals. Most important, 
analysts not specifically investing in TruPS CDOs generally do not know the issuer of TruPS 
going into each pool.” Larry Cordell, Michael Hopkins & Yilin Huang, The Trust Preferred 
CDO Market: From Start to (Expected) Finish 16 (Research Department, Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 11-22, 2011). 
130 Eveson, supra note 128, at 327-38. 
Source: Todd H. Eveson, Financial and Banking Holding Company 
Issuance of Trust Preferred Securities, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 315, 325 
(2002). 
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In order to formalize the promise that funds paid into the trust as 
interest on the debentures would be paid out to the holders of the TruPS, a 
Preferred Securities Guarantee was signed. This particular guarantee served 
two functions: (1) bridge the gap in privity between the holding company and 
the eventual holders of the TruPS (in large scale public offering the BHC 
executes a guarantee for the benefit of a guarantee trustee that acts in the 
collective interest of the holders of the TruPS) and (2) avoid the classification 
as an investment company under the 1940 Investment Company Act.131 
For the BHC, issuing TruPS meant cheap equity: while the cost of an 
initial common equity offering was between 11% and 7%, the cost of preferred 
stocks was 2.79%.132 Additionally, the issuing entity did not dilute the existing 
shareholders’ power because it did not grant shares with traditional voting 
rights.133 Finally, the debt quality of the security allowed the BHC to treat the 
interest paid to the SPE as tax deductible.134 Thus, the true economic substance 
of the TruPS was that the BHC was financing itself with subordinated debt, 
responding more to a debt obligation than a form of equity.135 
For investors (typically institutional, fixed-income investors, hedge 
funds and off-balance sheet Structured Investment Vehicles) TruPS represented 
a higher yield than straight debt issued by investment-grade borrowers. They 
provided a protection during bankruptcy compared to common equity because 
investors were paid before common stockholders, and the investors’ portfolios 
(of the ones subject to regulatory supervision) were deemed more stable.136 
On October 21, 1996,137 the Federal Reserve expressly authorized the 
BHC to include TruPS as up to 25% of core capital for their Tier 1 regulatory 
capital. Immediately thereafter, most of the large BHCs issued TruPS up to the 
permitted limit of Tier 1 capital138 and the issuance remained steady until 2000 
when Salomon Smith Barney issued the first TruPS Collateralized Debt 
Obligation (CDO).139 
																																								 																				
131 Id. at 328–29. 
132 Candemir Baltali & Joseph Tanega, Basel III: Dehybridization of Capital, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS. 23, 25 (2011). 
133 Eveson, supra note 128, at 316. 
134 Id. 
135 Powell Letter, supra note 127, at 4. 
136 FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 6. 
137 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. (Oct. 21, 1996), https://www. 
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/1996/19961021/default.htm.  
138 Trust Preferred Securities first appeared in 1993 but were not used by banks until the Fed’s 
authorization in 1996.  See FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 3 (discussing the 
usage of and reasons for Tier 1 capital in BHCs).  
139 MOODY’S, MOODY’S APPROACH TO RATING U.S. BANK TRUST PREFERRED SECURITY CDOS 
1 (2004). 
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TruPS CDOs represented an opportunity for small and medium size 
BHCs (unrated or poorly-rated) because TruPS were too expensive to issue on 
their own. Conversely, if TruPS of small banks were put together in a big pool, 
tranched and sold off as rated bonds to investors, the costs could be reduced 
significantly and the investors would rely on the high ratings.140 
Fitch reported that since the year 2000, 1,813 banking entities issued 
TruPS that were purchased by TruPS CDOs making a total of approximately 
$38 billion.141 Additionally, to provide most of the deals’ inputs, small banks 
also loaded up on the structured securities they produced.142 The express 
authorization of regulators for insured institutions to invest in their own 
TruPS143 created another layer of interconnectedness between financial 
institutions that created systemic risk once the crisis ignited. As the FDIC 
recounted in 2010, “banking organizations issuing TruPS failed at much higher 
rates during the period January 1, 2008 through November 5, 2010 than did 
insured banks generally or insured banks in BHCs that did not issue TruPS.144  
Beginning in 2003, after the Enron scandal, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (F.A.S.B.), a self-regulatory organization, began reviewing 
the consolidation rules under Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51, and the 
treatment of Special Purpose Vehicles. This revision led to the issuance of FIN 
46 and FIN 46R; thereafter, the BHC must reflect the deeply subordinated note 
issued to the SPE on its consolidated balance sheet, but it could not report the 
TruPS as a minority interest in a consolidated subsidiary.145 The new rules 
caused uncertainty among the financial institutions about how the Federal 
Reserve would treat these securities in capital requirements. However, the 
																																								 																				
140 See generally Jeff Horwitz, TruPS Leave Buyers in Limbo, 174 AM. BANKER 1  (determining 
that high credit rating of TruPS CDOs was based on the premise that “geographically diverse 
banks had never defaulted at significant rates”). Therefore, rating agencies required only a thin 
buffer of collateral, barely 2%, to protect a deal’s investment-grade tranches. Id.  
141 FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 4. 
142 See Cordell et al., supra note 118, at 3–4 (“Experts have estimated that banks have purchased 
some $12 billion of TruPS CDOs, mostly in mezzanine classes of the CDOs, which means that 
banks became a primary investor in the debt of the banking industry.”). 
143 See OCC, Interpretative Letter #777, 12 U.S.C. 24(7) 92 (Apr. 1997) (authorizing national 
banks to invest in TruPS if they meet the definition of “investment securities” according to 
regulation 12 C.F.R. Section 1.2(e), limit: 10% of capital and surplus (as a Type III security)); 
FDIC, Financial Institution Letter FIL-16-99 (Feb. 19, 1999) [hereinafter FDIC Letter] (“[Section 
24 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the corresponding regulations] do not restrict an 
insured state bank’s authority under state law to invest in trust preferred stock.” The investment 
must come within the same definition of investment security used by the OCC. FDIC regulated 
institutions are not subject to the 10% limit); OTS, Third Bulletin 73(a) (Dec. 18, 2001) 
(explaining that thrifts may invest in TruPS up to 15% of its total capital). 
144 FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17, at 14. 
145 Powell Letter, supra note 127, at 2. 
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uncertainty was resolved very quickly when, on May 6, 2004, the Federal 
Reserve proposed and then approved a regulation allowing the TruPS to 
maintain the Tier 1 status and only lowered from 25% to 15% the limit of 
TruPS allowable in Tier 1 for internationally active holding companies.146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a consequence, TruPS and TruPS CDOs grew, reaching a total 
outstanding of $140 billion in the first quarter of 2010. Nearly 90% of the banks 
had some TruPS in their capital structures, having issued TruPS themselves or 
having bought other banks’ TruPS as investments. 
As Nicole Boyson et al observe, “it was more common for banks to use 
[TruPS] as a [marginal funding mechanism, so that] when they made acqui-
sitions or [had] considerable internal growth that would have reduced their Tier 
1 capital ratios, [they] used [TruPS] instead of equity to maintain their prior Tier 
1 capital ratios.”147 BHC clearly used TruPS to pursue aggressive internal and 
external growth. And while most research leading to the crisis painted a picture 
of very safe and sound banks relying on the fact that banks were holding more 
capital than required, they failed to uncover the true quality of BHC capital. 
The fundamental concept to understand about this particular regulatory 
arbitrage that BHCs gamed, was that this complex transaction raised a signifi-
cant issue of the insured banks’ safety and soundness. Tier 1 capital is considered 
																																								 																				
146 Id. at 1. 
147 Id. at 4. 
Source: Nicole Boyson, Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René Stulz, Why do Banks 
Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred 
Securities at 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19984, 
2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19984.pdf 
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a core capital element, fully available to absorb losses while the banking 
organization is under stress. TruPS definitively did not have the qualities of a 
core capital element. As the FDIC had concluded, these securities were a liability 
of the parent BHC and—in spite of their characteristics—they could not absorb 
losses as equity does and therefore could not count as Tier 1 capital.148    
Significantly, the BHC’s diluted and worthless capital put pressure on 
FDIC-insured subsidiaries. “[I]nvestors in trust preferred securities have a 
contractual right to full payment of principal and interest and, if such payments 
are deferred, their claim on the trust both cumulates and compounds. The 
requirement to service this obligation can place undue pressure on other entities 
within a BHC, including FDIC-insured bank subsidiaries, regardless of whe-
ther such payments are in the subsidiary bank’s financial interest. While the 
ability to defer dividend payments may provide an organization with temporary 
relief, there is strong market pressure to keep such payments current, or to bring 
them current in the event of payment deferral.”149  
Thus, it is not surprising to see studies where TruPS usage was linked 
to poorer performance and more probability of default, observing patterns of 
riskier behavior among the TruPS users. As the FDIC notes, “[t]he banking 
industry has experienced significant write-downs of mezzanine bond-holdings. 
Over the past two years, the failure of federally insured depository institutions 
was due largely, or in part, to their investment in TruPS CDOs.”150 
Finally, it is not surprising to discover that banks with a higher 
proportion of TruPS in their Tier 1 capital were significantly more likely to 
receive funds from the Capital Purchase Program, a part of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program which cost taxpayers $205 billion between October 2008 and 
December 2009.151 
																																								 																				
148 See Powell Letter, supra note 127, at 7 (“Even in the absence of deferral, trust preferred 
securities are ‘permanent’ only in the sense of being binding long-term commitments by the 
organization to make regular fixed dividend payments for the life of the debenture, which is 
typically 30 years or less. Trust preferred securities cannot absorb losses on a going-concern 
basis, because they give rise to a fixed liability that can only be avoided in the event of 
default. Deferral of dividends can conserve cash flow for five years but this would not offset 
any losses as the dividend obligation continues to accrue.”).  
149 Id. 
150 FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17. See also Powell Letter, supra note 127, at 
6 (“In times of financial distress at the banking level, the debt service requirements of trust 
preferred securities has the potential to force the bank to increase its risk profile in order to 
increase cash liquidity for dividend payments, divert income from critical internal investment 
needs, and to take other actions that lead them away from safe and sound banking 
practices.”); FDIC SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, supra note 17. 
151 See PEIYI YU & BAC VAN LUU, LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE IN HYBRID CAPITAL 
SECURITIES 23 (“Institutions that had almost used up their allowance of innovative Tier 1 
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In the naïve belief that after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and, more specifically, Section 171 (generally 
referred to as the Collins Amendment), banks will now be safe and sound—and 
that the hybrid securities will never again be part of the core capital elements of 
insured banks and bank holding companies—new regulations keep allowing this 
toxic instrument to survive and propagate, achieving levels of financial leverage 
and activities impermissible otherwise.152  
 
II. HOW DID THE FED CONTRIBUTE TO THE INEQUALITY PROBLEM?  
 
Did the Federal Reserve’s aggressive pre-crisis deregulation of capital 
requirements, its off-balance-sheet permissions, and its enthusiasm for 
complexly structured financial instruments have an impact on post-crisis 
economic inequality trends?153 Few scholars have asked this basic question.154 
The Fed is the most powerful economic institution in the world. A close 
examination of its recent policies will shed some light on the question of the 
connection between Fed policies and the growing problem of economic 
inequality. This paper seeks to stimulate that necessary conversation. 
Former Fed Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin155 was the intellectual 
leader of the effort to bring inequality analysis to the fore in Fed thinking, 
																																								 																				
securities issuance (and thus had little leeway to issue new securities) were more likely to 
require a government bailout.”).  
152 See Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Agencies Approve Interim 
Final Rule Authorizing Retention of Interests in and Sponsorship of Collateralized Debt 
Obligations Backed Primarily by Bank-Issued Trust Preferred Securities, (Jan. 14, 2014) 
(“Five federal agencies on Tuesday approved an interim final rule to permit banking entities 
to retain interests in certain collateralized debt obligations backed primarily by trust preferred 
securities (TruPS CDOs) from the investment prohibitions of section 619 of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, known as the Volcker rule.”). 
153 Frank Partnoy & Lynn E. Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting, 
in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 85 (2010).  
154  An important exception is the work of economist, Gary A Dymski, who argued that the 
root causes of the subprime crisis were (1) the systemic exclusion of racial minorities from 
participation in mortgage-finance, (2) the creation of new financial assets designed to generate 
net income for banks, and (3) the “unique global macroeconomic position” of the United States. 
Gary A. Dymski, Racial Exclusion and the Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis, 17 HIST. 
MATERIALISM 149, 150–51 (2009). I discussed the question of redistribution up in my paper 
presented to the LatCrit Conference in 2013. In addition, there is a growing chorus of 
journalistic commentary in the blogs and within both the conservative and liberal think tanks 
that does focus on the Fed as a vehicle of wealth redistribution that fueled inequality.   
155 Sarah Bloom Raskin was sworn in as the first woman Deputy Secretary of Treasury in 
2014, after she stepped down as a member of the Board of Governors. See Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Sarah Bloom Raskin Sworn in as Deputy Secretary (Apr. 11, 
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through a series of intellectually stimulating speeches and policy papers.156 
Raskin has repeatedly explored the impact of monetary and bank regulatory 
policy on unemployment, economic marginalization, and financial 
vulnerability among millions of moderate- and low-income Americans. In an 
April 2013 speech she addressed “an issue of growing saliency that 
macroeconomic models used at central banks and by academics have not 
traditionally emphasized—specifically, how such economic marginalization 
and financial vulnerability, associated with stagnant wages and rising 
inequality, contributed to the run-up to the financial crisis and how such 
marginalization and vulnerability could be relevant in the current recovery.”157 
By contrast, Janet Yellen, the new Federal Reserve chair, succinctly 
endorsed conventional macroeconomic wisdom about the role of the Fed in 
economic inequality. During her November 2013 confirmation testimony, she 
told the senators: 
 
Economists have spent a lot of time trying to understand what 
is responsible for widening inequality. Many of the underlying 
factors are things that are outside the Federal Reserve’s ability 
to address . . . . There is a lot of research, a lot of debate about 
exactly what the causes of this problem are, perhaps having to 
																																								 																				
2015) (describing the swearing-in ceremony of Raskin and previous position on the Board 
of Governors); Annie Lowrey, Raskin Would Be the First Female Deputy at Treasury, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2013, https://nyti.ms/2kD2WSp (describing Raskin’s position as the first 
female deputy). 
156 See generally Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Conference (Mar. 22, 
2013) (discussing current recovery’s job creation; “how the absence of a substantial number 
of new high-paying jobs, when combined with changes in the landscape for financial 
services, affects access generally to affordable, sustainable credit”; and “the monetary, 
supervisory, and regulatory touchpoints in which the situation and prospect of low- and 
moderate-income working Americans can be addressed”); Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at Building a Financial Structure for a 
More Stable and Equitable Economy, the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the 
State of the U.S. and World Economies (Apr. 18, 2013) (“[E]xamining . . . . how such 
economic marginalization and financial vulnerability, associated with stagnant wages and 
rising inequality, contributed to the run-up to the financial crisis and how such marginal-
ization and vulnerability could be relevant in the current recovery.”); Sarah Bloom Raskin, 
Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Society of Government 
Economists and the National Economists Club (May 16, 2013) (“[I offer] my assessment of 
recent economic developments and the economic outlook, and . . . the actions that the Federal 
Reserve has been taking, in light of its view of developments and the outlook, to support the 
economic recovery.”).  
157  See Raskin, supra note 156. 
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do in part with the nature of technological change, with . . . 
globalization and the decline of unions. The solutions involve 
a multitude of things including . . . early childhood education. 
What can the Fed do? (emphasis added) We cannot change all 
of those trends.158 
 
Yellen shares the liberal economic view that while inequality is bad, 
the Federal Reserve is not responsible for the primary drivers of this 
inequality: education, technological innovation, and globalization. In the 
transcripts and minutes of the 2007-9 meetings of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), Yellen shows her talent as a prescient, reliable evaluator 
of the proper balance the Fed should bring to evaluating the conflicting 
economic signals of inflation and unemployment. Her empathic observations 
about the human toll of unemployment reveal a genuine personal commitment 
to the Fed’s statutory mandate to lower unemployment, and especially to 
address the devastating effects of long-term unemployment.159  In a paper co-
authored with, Nobel Prize–winning economist George Akerlof, her husband, 
they write that “[p]olicy makers should be compelled to take action given the 
serious costs of long-term unemployment when overall unemployment is 
already high. A week of unemployment is worse when it is experienced as 
part of a longer spell.”160   
Thomas Piketty argues that the Fed is in charge of redistribution of 
wealth:  
 
[I]t is important to realize that central banks do not create 
wealth as such; they redistribute it. . . . Rapid execution is the 
principal strength of the monetary authorities.  The weakness 
of central banks is clearly their limited ability to decide who 
should receive loans in what amount and for what duration.161  
																																								 																				
158  To be fair, it is conventional wisdom that nominees for high-level federal positions hew 
closely to the conventional wisdom of the agency for which they have been nominated.  
Therefore, Yellen’s answer is reasonable in the circumstance.  However, it does provide a 
concise statement of Fed orthodoxy on inequality. Yellen Nomination, supra note 1, at 32. 
159 See, e.g., FED. RES. SYS., MEETING OF THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE ON 
SEPTEMBER 22-23, 2009 95–96 (2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/file 
s/FOMC20090923meeting.pdf (providing Ms. Yellen’s observations on the state of financial 
markets at the time). 
160 Craig Torres & Joshua Zumbrun, Yellen’s Focus on Unemployment Adopted by Fed After 
Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUS., Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
04-25/yellen-s-unemployment-focus-adopted-by-bernanke-fed-after-crisis. 
161  PIKETTY, supra note 92, at 550, 552.  
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The problem is that central banks lack the democratic legitimacy. Piketty fur-
ther argues that “central banks . . . can redistribute wealth quickly and 
massively, but they can also be very wrong in their choice of targets.”162 Piketty 
concludes that the problem is not one of technical impossibility, but of 
democratic governance. 
Despite the laudable empathy for the unemployed, Yellen’s stance 
reveals critical analytic failures. During the period leading up to the financial 
crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve was a powerful matrix for economic 
inequality through both action and inaction. My argument here relies upon 
recognizing a structural continuity between the Fed’s pre-crisis deregulatory 
agenda and its now legendary post-crisis intervention. The pre-crisis deregulation 
set the stage for the magnitude of the uncontrolled, unanticipated collapse of 
the interdependent networks created by that deregulatory agenda.  
 
A. Cognitive Narrowness: Framing the Narrative of Miscalculation 
 
“Some important lessons emerge from the story [of the Great Depression]. 
One lesson is that ideas are critical.”163 
 
- Ben Bernanke, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
 
“People who belong to a group that makes decisions have a tendency to self-
censor and not express ideas that don’t conform to the perceived professional 
standard. They’re too professional. They are not creative and imaginative in 
their approach”164  
 
- Robert Shiller, 2013 Nobel Laureate for Economic Sciences 
 
The Federal Reserve decision-making process and output displayed a 
persistent “cognitive narrowness” before, during, and after the crisis. In my 
view, the dynamic pattern of “interdependent network theory,” developed first 
in physics and biology, provides a powerful tool for explaining the suddenness 
of the financial collapse and the amplification of the impact beyond the 
subprime mortgage market. 
																																								 																				
162 Id. at 552. 
163 Money, Gold, and the Great Depression, supra note 187. 
164 Robert Stowe England, Robert Shiller Says Markets Have Become More Prone to 
Bubbles, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/ 
article/3313677/asset-management-macro/robert-shiller-says-markets-have-become-more-
prone-to-bubbles.html (providing excerpts from the author’s interview with Robert Schiller). 
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Former Chair Ben Bernanke’s testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (FCIC) reveals the devastating impact of cognitive narrowness at 
the very top of the Fed. Bernanke testified, on one hand, that the Fed could not 
have anticipated the financial crisis or its severity because the crisis was “a 
perfect storm,” an unpredictable Act of God. On the other hand, in response to 
a question about the Fed’s lack of aggressiveness in regulating the mortgage 
market during the steep ascent of housing prices, Bernanke admitted that the 
failure to rein in abusive lending practices “was the most severe failure of the 
Fed in this particular episode.”165 
In this section, I offer a novel explanation of how the Fed became a 
matrix of inequality. In my discussion, I rely on the two concepts mentioned 
above, concepts that have received scant attention in the vast literature of legal 
scholarship on the financial crisis. First, I explain cognitive narrowness and then 
explore its impact on Federal Reserve decision-making. Second, I introduce 
interdependent network theory166 as a useful conceptual tool to explain how Fed 
policy before the crisis created several interdependent networks that converged 
beyond its cognitively narrowed perception of the growing risk. The 
interdependent networks began forming on an indispensable foundation of 
aggressive deregulation that included both affirmative permissions to shift risk 
																																								 																				
165 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at xvii. 
166 See generally PRASANNA GAI, SYSTEMIC RISK: THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS (2013). I have relied on the work of Gai, in the developing field of financial 
network theory. Gai’s contribution to the finance literature in this work has been summarized 
as follows:   
 
This book opens new ground in the study of financial crises. It treats the 
financial system as a complex adaptive system and shows how lessons 
from network disciplines - such as ecology, epidemiology, and statistical 
mechanics - shed light on our understanding of financial stability. Using 
tools from network theory and economics, it suggests that financial 
systems are robust-yet-fragile, with knife-edge properties that are greatly 
exacerbated by the hoarding of funds and the fire sale of assets by banks. 
The book studies the damaging network consequences of the failure of 
large inter-connected institutions, explains how key funding markets can 
seize up across the entire financial system, and shows how the pursuit of 
secured finance by banks in the wake of the global financial crisis can 
generate systemic risks. The insights are then used to model banking 
systems calibrated to data to illustrate how financial sector regulators are 
beginning to quantify financial system stress. 
 
Oxford Univ. Press, Description of SYSTEMIC RISK: THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/systemic-risk-9780 
199544493. 
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to off-balance-sheet dark zones and inaction in the failure to police the 
spreading virus of subprime and racial exploitation in mortgage lending. The 
interdepend-dent network framework is useful in explaining how cognitive 
narrowness and race were linked in an interdependent set of “nodes”167 that 
came together during the crisis, because it offers a physical image of the cata-
strophic, cascading results that produce exponentially large failures exceeding 
the sum of the individual parts. 
 
1. Key Federal Reserve Actions that Increased Economic Inequality   
 
In what follows, I identify three major categories of Federal Reserve 
action that increased economic inequality during the financial crisis of 2008: 
 
a. Category I:  Deregulation  
 
First and foremost, the Federal Reserve undertook a program of system-
atic deregulation and non-enforcement of legal rules that would have prevented 
the proliferation of the unsustainable subprime mortgages that formed the heart 
of the crisis.  
Second, the Federal Reserve adopted a series of explicit off-balance-
sheet permissions that allowed regulated banks and their holding companies to 
move the origination and distribution system for home loans off the bank 
balance sheet into unregulated entities that facilitated the growth of a massive 
“shadow” banking sector. Hidden from government view, this shadow sector 
was especially vulnerable to systemic panics and runs because it lacked three 
indispensable safeguards that stabilized the traditional banking system: 
regulated capital cushions, transparent transactions, and primary supervisory 
oversight of the quality of its transactions.168  
																																								 																				
167  I use the term “nodes” in the context of the 2008 financial crisis to capture the list of 
interactive relationships of off balance sheet deregulation, interconnection between formal 
banks and the shadow bank system consisting of maturity transformation through short term 
financing provided by money market funds and asset backed commercial paper facilities. 
168  Fed Governor Tarullo has taken the lead on the discussion of what regulatory approach 
is best to address the systemic risks arising from the interconnected, dark balance sheets that 
remain in the shadow sector six years after the crisis.  Tarullo has spoken often about this 
development. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at the Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference 
(Nov. 22, 2013) (“Support provided for shadow banking activities may be either explicit or 
implicit. In some cases, there are explicit contractual provisions for credit enhancements and 
liquidity support. In other cases, the support is implicit, based on a bank’s historical pattern 
of providing support or a belief among investors that a bank will provide support to maintain 
the value of its franchise. In the lead-up to the crisis, explicit and implicit commitments by 
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b. Category II:  Cognitive Narrowness 
 
Cognitive narrowness provides a comprehensive explanation of the 
Fed’s failure to recognize that the pervasive interconnectedness of the invisible 
shadow sector and the formal sector posed an imminent threat to the stability of 
the entire global financial system when housing prices began to decline in 2005. 
Most scholarly analyses,169 government investigations,170 and post-crisis autop-
sies171 have concluded, in hindsight, that pervasive interconnection between the 
																																								 																				
regulated banking firms to shadow banks often combined to create the assumption that the 
liabilities of such entities were risk-free. This perception led to an underpricing of the risks 
embedded in these money-like instruments, making them an artificially cheap source of 
funding and creating an oversupply of these instruments that contributed to systemic risk.”); 
Craig Torres & Jeff Kearns, Tarullo Backs More Capital for Firms Relying on Repo Funds, 
BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 22, 2013) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-22/tarullo-backs-
more-capital-for-firms-relying-on-repo-funding.html (“Shadow banking, including money 
market funds and off balance sheet investment vehicles, grew $5 trillion last year to about 
$71 trillion, the Financial Stability Board, a global financial policy group based in Basel, 
Switzerland, said last week.”); Emily Stephenson & Douwe Miedema, Fed’s Tarullo: Short-
term Bank Funding Should Be Top Regulatory Focus, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-feds-tarullo-idUSBRE98J0OY20130920 
(“[Regulators are] beefing up capital requirements and cracking down on short-term funding 
[and] are looking at ways to prevent banking activities from migrating away from regulated 
entities and into so-called ‘shadow banks.’”). 
169  See generally Ricardo J. Caballero, & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity (Mass. 
Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 15479, 2009); Rama Cont et al., Network Structure and 
Systemic Risk in Banking Systems, OPUS FINANCE 1; Prasanna Gai et al., Complexity, 
Concentration and Contagion, 58 J. MONETARY ECON. 453 (2011); Maarten R.C.van Oordt & 
Chen Zhou, Systematic Risk under Adverse Market Conditions (De Nederlandsche Bank and 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Working Paper, 2011); Nikola Tarashev et al., The Systemic 
Importance of Financial Institutions, BIS QUARTERLY REV. 75 (2009); Lev Ratnovski, Bank 
Liquidity Regulation and the Lender of Last Resort (Bank of England and University of 
Amsterdam, Working Paper 2007); Rama Cont et al, Too Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and 
Systemic Risk in Financial Networks, (Columbia Univ. & Université de Paris, 2009); Franklin 
Allen et al, Financial Connections and Systemic Risk (Wharton, 2010); Viral V. Acharya et al, 
Measuring Systemic Risk (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper 10-02, 2010).  
170  See generally CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVEST-
IGATIONS: COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL 
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE MAJORITY AND 
MINORITY STAFF REPORT (2011).  
171  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS 
LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT (2013); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 14-18, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES: STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT FUTURE SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY 
IMPLEMENTED (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 10-16,  TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM: ONE YEAR LATER: ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS REMAINING 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES (2009).  
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formal banking system and the shadow sector led to an exponential increase in 
the scope of the damage to the financial sector and the overall economy, but I go 
beyond the consensus structural analysis of the causes of the crisis.  
I argue that an important deficit in Federal Reserve leadership172 was 
its blindness173 to the nation’s history of racial discrimination in housing.174 
This lack of historical understanding proved lethal. The crisis-period 
transcripts of the meetings of the FOMC show that the Board repeatedly 
underestimated the near cataclysmic effects of the looming global subprime 
crisis because of its deeply mistaken belief that if the housing bubble burst, the 
effect would be an easily contained recession, on the scale of the collapse of 
the asset bubble of the Silicon Valley technology start-ups. The dot-com 
comparison is one significant marker of how far afield the limited cultural and 
social imagination of the Fed would carry it from recognizing the role of 
racially discriminatory lending in the American housing market.  
Chairman Bernanke’s memoir captures an important dimension of this 
blindness.  Bernanke recognized that although the Fed saw the pieces of the 
puzzle that would create the financial crisis, “but we failed to understand— 
‘failed to imagine’ might be a better phrase—how those pieces would fit 
together to produce a financial crisis.”175 
 
c. Category III:  The Fed’s Post-Crisis Bailouts and 
Emergency Lending  
 
The Fed’s crisis response “saved” the global economy by distributing 
$12 trillion in emergency lending to non-banks and nothing directly to 
homeowners to enable them to restructure flawed mortgage loans and remain 
in their homes. This decision contributed to the growth of inequality after the 
																																								 																				
172 The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is a body of the United States Federal 
Reserve System. Composed of twelve members (the seven members of the Board of 
Governors, the president of the New York Fed and four other Reserve Bank presidents who 
serve on a rotating basis), the FOMC is in charge of carrying out one of the most important 
roles in the U.S. economy: the formulation and conduct of monetary policy through open 
market operations (buying and selling of federal government bonds in order to influence the 
money supply and interest rate). 
173 See, for example, my discussion of Federal Reserve lack of knowledge regarding history 
of racial discrimination in housing, infra notes 7–11.   
174 Gordon, supra note 40, at 186; see Ben Brantley, No Rest For the Weary: ‘Raisin in the 
Sun’ Brings Denzel Washington Back to Broadway, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2014, at C1 
(referring to a Twitter comment that claimed that Lorraine Hansberry’s iconic play about the 
African American longing for home ownership should be an indispensable component of the 
orientation for every new Fed Board member).  
175 BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT 82 (2015).  
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crisis by draining wealth in housing from homeowners in foreclosure while 
distributing wealth to the financial sector.176 According to one estimate, real 
household wealth declined by $19 trillion between July 2007 and January 
2009, and the Fed reported that median family net worth fell 38.8%. By March 
2009, retirement savings had lost an estimated $3.4 trillion, 40% of their 
value.177 For those nearing retirement, these losses were irretrievable. 
 
2. Monetary Theory, Bank Regulation,178 and Ben’s Promise 
 
Milton Friedman’s ninetieth birthday celebration, on Friday November 
8, 2002, was a grand intellectual occasion for the orthodox branch of the 
economics profession.  The University of Chicago invited a distinguished 
group of economists, including Nobel Laureate James Heckman and Federal 
Reserve Board member Benjamin Bernanke.  The fete and conference were 
held at the architecturally important Max Palevsky Cinema, with elegant red 
velvet seating on two levels for 375 attendees, in Ida Noyes Hall on the 
East 59th Street side of campus.  
Ben Bernanke’s speech at 3 p.m. that day was a highly anticipated end-
of-the- birthday celebration and conference that welcomed Nobel Prize winner 
Friedman for a “rare return to campus” from his home in California. The 
																																								 																				
176 Mark Pittman & Bob Ivory, Financial Rescue Nears GDP as Pledges Top $12.8 Trillion, 
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 31, 2009. 
177 Atkinson, Luttrell & Rosenblum, supra note 18. 
178 See Donna Borak, Will The Fed's Capital Rules Interfere with Monetary Policy?, 
AMERICAN BANKER (Apr. 17, 2014), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-the-feds-
capital-rules-interfere-with-monetary-policy, for a discussion of how the overlap and 
potential conflicts between monetary and bank regulation policy has only recently come to 
attention as reported in the financial press. 
 
The Fed's banking rule writers in years past paid little, if any, attention to 
the potential fallout of their efforts on monetary policy or the broader 
economy, perhaps making a small mention of how a regulatory change 
could result in fewer loans. But nowadays Fed officials are repeatedly 
drawing links between financial stability and monetary policy, including 
which is better at spotting or reducing asset-price bubbles. Fed Chairman 
Ben Bernanke set that line of thinking in motion, and new Chair Janet 
Yellen has made balancing monetary policy and bank supervision the 
central bank's No. 3 priority behind the two disciplines themselves. 
“Nobody talked about the link between financial stability and monetary 
policy,” Petrou said. “Academics didn't see it, and the Fed didn't 
understand it, and so nobody thought about it. We learned the hard way 
how intertwined financial stability and monetary policy can be. 
 
Id. 
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excitement that afternoon centered on the fact that Bernanke’s 1983 American 
Economics Review article, “The Non-monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis 
in the Propagation of the Great Depression,”179 was an important revision that 
built on Friedman and Schwartz’ monetary theory of the causes of the 
Depression.180 As a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 
Bernanke had both ideas and the power to implement his ideas. Bernanke’s 
scholarly, well-researched speech that afternoon catalogued Friedman’s 
contributions to macroeconomic thinking.181   
The speech is most remembered, however, for Bernanke’s closing, a 
promise to Friedman and his longtime collaborator, Anna Schwartz: “I would 
like to say to Milton and Anna: regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, 
we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”182 
By all accounts, Bernanke strove gallantly to keep that promise as the 
Chair and intellectual leader of the Board during the crisis. Bernanke’s 
reference to “we did it” in the now famous “promise” refers to two schools of 
thought within the Hoover Administration after the stock market crash and the 
subsequent dramatic loss of productivity and banking stability. The passive 
liquidationists, led by Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, and the Fed, 
argued that the government should not intervene in a banking panic because 
the disruption and purging of the economy, no matter how painful to innocent 
citizens, were necessary to restore the balance within the capitalist economic 
system. Hoover’s memoirs assign this infamous phrase to Mellon: “Liquidate 
labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, and liquidate real estate.”183 
																																								 																				
179  See generally Ben S. Bernanke, The Non-monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983).  
180 Bernanke was careful to make clear in the birthday speech that his own work on the 
Depression did not reject Friedman and Schwartz’ basic monetary thesis that “the contraction 
is in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces.” As I have always tried 
to make clear, my argument for nonmonetary influences of bank failures is simply an 
embellishment of the Friedman-Schwartz story; it in no way contradicts the basic logic of 
their analysis. Ben S. Bernanke, Governor of the Bd. of Directors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech 
on Milton Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday, Remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton 
Friedman (Nov. 8, 2002). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1929-
1941 30 (1953). Note that Hoover’s attribution of Mellon’s hardline liquidationist quote has 
recently been challenged by banking scholar Larry White, who counts Hoover’s memoirs as 
revisionist history, designed to polish Hoover’s irreparably damaged presidential legacy by 
assigning the most heartless version of the now widely discredited liquidationist theory of 
monetary policy to his Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon. Lawrence H. White, Did 
Hayek and Robbins Deepen the Great Depression?, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 751, 
758-59 (2008). 
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For liquidationists, panics and recessions were a good way to purge the 
excess credit spilling out after an imprudent credit binge, like the stock market 
speculation that preceded the Crash of 1929. President Hoover aligns himself 
with the second school of the opposing forces that lost the liquidationist battle at 
the Fed. Hoover argued that he favored “cushioning” the impacts of the collapse 
by government action, such as creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
designed to save the railroads, and to provide liquidity to banks to cushion the 
disruption of depositor panics. Hoover said that he favored protecting unem-
ployed workers, farmers and other small businesses from bankruptcies.184  
The “liquidationist theory” carried the day, and in 1928 the Fed decided 
to begin a series of interest rate increases. Liquidationists believed that after a 
credit-fueled bubble the central bank should mop up the excess credit in the 
economy by raising interest rates. Today this approach is widely mocked as a 
foolish policy choice that damaged the US economy, leading to 25% unem-
ployment, the collapse of the U.S. banking system and a prolonged disruption 
of the economic security of the nation.185   
Instead of the liquidationist theory that captivated the Depression Fed 
and Mellon,186 the Greenspan-Bernanke Fed was committed to the largely 
discredited ideas of radical financial deregulation, self-correcting markets, and 
moral hazard as a basis for intervention in systemic panics. In the Friedman 
birthday speech, Ben Bernanke lamented the series of Fed decisions from 1928 
to 1932 to contract the money supply. Under this approach, the Fed raised 
interest rates and failed to supply emergency lending to banks suffering 
depositor runs. They thus missed the chance to restore confidence in the safety 
of deposits in the system of the time, before deposit insurance. 
Indeed, a central element of the Federal Reserve’s original mission had 
been to provide just this type of assistance (lender of last resort lending to stem 
depositor runs) to the banking system. The Fed’s failure to fulfill its mission 
																																								 																				
184 HOOVER, supra note 183, at 31. 
185 Id. Bernanke, provides this account of the impact of the Depression on views of government: 
 
The impact that the experience of the Depression has had on views about 
the role of the government in the economy is easily understood when we 
recall the sheer magnitude of that economic downturn. During the major 
contraction phase of the Depression, between 1929 and 1933, real output 
in the United States fell nearly 30 percent. During the same period, 
according to retrospective studies, the unemployment rate rose from about 
3 percent to nearly 25 percent, and many of those lucky enough to have a 
job were able to work only part-time. 
Id. 
186 Andrew Mellon, Hoover’s Secretary of the Treasury, is widely quoted as the source of a 
heartless version of liquidationist theory. White, supra note 183, at 758–59. 
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was, again, largely the result of the economic theories held by the Federal 
Reserve leadership.  The infamous “liquidationist” thesis of Treasury Secretary 
Andrew Mellon, who argued that weeding out “weak” banks was a harsh but 
necessary prerequisite to the recovery of the banking system.187 
 
3. The Harms of Narrow Academic and Professional Cultures  
in Macroeconomics  
 
The sad irony of the brilliance of Ben Bernanke is that, just like the 
Depression-era Fed that became unwisely attached to the bad idea(s) known as 
the “liquidationist” theory of monetary policy, Bernanke and the Fed of his era 
became attached to their own set of bad ideas. In the 2008 financial crisis, the 
bad ideas that Bernanke-Greenspan embraced were the laissez faire belief in self-
correcting markets leading to radical financial deregulation.  This approach then 
cascaded to create a regulation-free zone consisting of an opaque shadow 
banking system devoid of capital cushions. Such an environment created balance 
sheet fusion with the formal banks, lack of regulatory oversight and finally blind 
reliance on macroeconomic tools (interest rates up or down to get out of a 
recession) just as the second greatest global financial and economic crisis came 
to a head.   
As I discuss more fully below, the interconnected nodes—created by 
Fed bank regulatory action and inaction before the crisis—converged between 
2004 and 2008 to create a financial disaster that was beyond the cognitive 
perception of a collection of the best and the brightest macroeconomists leading 
the Federal Reserve. The crisis exposed a cognitive narrowness that reflects 
continuity from pre-crisis belief in self-correcting markets for home loans 
(without government rules to prevent exploitation of vulnerable populations) to 
the post-crisis effort to adhere, incompletely, to a diffuse concept of moral 
hazard precepts for public policy choices in a global credit crisis. Both 
liquidationist theory and laissez faire belief in self-correcting markets, 
historically plagued with racial exploitation, were economic phrenology.  They 
were pseudo-scientific understandings of how the world works, even as it was 
changing dramatically. 
The 2008 financial crisis was the result of a profound economic miscalcu-
lation by the Federal Reserve. The transcripts188 of the Federal Reserve meetings 
																																								 																				
187 Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Money, Gold, and the 
Great Depression. Remarks at the H. Parker Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, (May 2, 
2004) [hereinafter Money, Gold, and the Great Depression].  
188  TRANSCRIPTS OF FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE MEETINGS 2007-2009, available 
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2007.htm, https://www.fe 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2017 
 
 
158 
from the most intense period of the financial crisis, 2007-2009, provide, for the 
first time, a comprehensive factual basis for evaluating the dynamics of these 
highly confidential deliberations. This Article offers a novel framework of 
“cognitive narrowness”189 to answer two crucial questions about the Fed’s 
failure to see the residential mortgage train headed straight for the global 
economy. First, why didn’t they see the crisis approaching? Second, why didn’t 
they have contingency plans in place for the doomsday scenario that all major 
federal agencies are required to have in their areas of responsibility? 
What factors within the Board’s decision-making process obscured its 
view of the potential for panic in the unregulated shadow banking system, and 
caused its attention to be drawn instead to the wrong problem, inflation? This 
misdirection meant that this global central bank was forced to resort to ad hoc 
solutions. Fortunately, they mostly worked. But, we are still left with the 
lingering question of why the Fed’s pre-crisis planning failed to generate a 
previously agreed upon plan of action for the real crisis: a panic in the 
unregulated shadow banking market, consisting of hedge funds, pension funds 
and complex structured financial instruments to provide short term funding for 
residential mortgage securitizations. The crisis that emerged in 2008 was 
within the Fed’s responsibility as a financial regulator. However, bank 
regulation was an orphan among the Fed’s many economic leadership roles. 
This section combines four different, but related, features.  These four 
dynamics fit within my concept of “cognitive narrowness.”  This framework 
provides a useful way of starting to figure out the reason for the most profound 
economic miscalculation since the Great Depression. The first of the four 
features is the Board’s ideological commitment to free markets in financial 
regulation; the second is the narrow band of professional training in macroecon-
omics within the Board of Governors constrained awareness of how the pre-
crisis deregulation had unleashed unbridled risk that was hidden from view.   
The third feature is that the composition of the board and rotating 
membership in the Fed Open Markets Committee lacked a diverse set of 
perceptual tools and experience.190  Regarding this particular features, decisional 
																																								 																				
deralreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm, and https://www.federalreserve. 
gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2009.htm (last visited Oct. 16 2016) [hereinafter FOMC 
TRANSCRIPTS]. Note that the charts, graphs, and other supporting documents were released 
on Friday, February 21, 2014. 
189 I have adopted the label “cognitive narrowness” to describe four separate, but related 
phenomena that are observable in the Federal Reserve policy actions before and after the 
Financial Crisis. 
190 After confirmation, upon assuming formal leadership of the Fed, Chair Yellen addressed the 
problem of insufficient diversity in the economics profession as a contributing factor in the 
failure of the profession to see the financial crisis.  Yellen has proven to be a visionary leader 
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economist Scott Page was able to establish through models for difficult problems 
that a diversity of perspectives, heuristics, and personal experience trumped 
individual ability and homogeneity. The Page models showed that “a randomly 
selected collection of individual problem solvers outperforms a collection of the 
best individual problem solver.”191 
Finally, fourth, the Fed displayed many of the characteristics of 
Groupthink, first catalogued by Yale social psychologist, Irving Janis, in his 
																																								 																				
speaking to the economics profession about the conceptual problems afflicting the predictive 
power of macroeconomics.  Nicholas Lemann, The Hand on the Lever: How Janet Yellen is 
Redefining the Federal Reserve, NEW YORKER (July 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2014/07/21/the-hand-on-the-lever.   
 
Speaking to the American Economics Association, October 2014, Yellen observed: 
 
There has been a fair amount of public debate in recent years about the health 
of the economics profession, prompted in part by the failure of many 
economists to comprehend the dire threats and foresee the damage of the 
financial crisis. When the public asks whether economists did all they could 
have to understand those threats, in part they are asking whether our 
profession did enough over the years to test ideas and assumptions that turned 
out in some cases to have been mistaken or misplaced. And part of that 
question is this one: Did the economics profession recruit and promote the 
individuals best able to bring the energy, the fresh insights, and the renewal 
that every field and every body of knowledge needs to remain healthy? 
 
Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Welcoming Remarks at the 
National Summit on Diversity in the Economics Profession, (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20141030a.htm. 
  
For Yellen’s comments on network theory, see Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors, 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and 
Policy Implications, Remarks at the American Economic Association/American Finance 
Association Joint Luncheon (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
yellen20130104a.htm [hereinafter Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk]. 
  
For Yellen’s comments on unemployment, see Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors, Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Labor Market Dynamics and Monetary Policy, Remarks at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/yellen20140822a.htm. 
 
For Yellen’s comments on subprime mortgages, see Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors, 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Housing Market Developments and Their Effects on Low-and Moderate-
Income Neighborhoods, Remarks at the 2011 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy 
Summit (June 9, 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110609a.htm. 
191 SCOTT PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER 
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 162–74 (2008). 
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classic study of failures in high level government decision-making groups.192 
Janis study identifies the how the dynamic of closed-minded “groupthink” led 
to several major “government fiascoes.” Irving explores how the flawed, narrow 
cognitive style of small high level groups of government decision-makers led 
to the major “fiascoes” of bad decision-making before Pearl Harbor: the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the separation of North and South 
Korea. Finally, Janis concludes that the Watergate cover-up was a classic fiasco, 
in which a small group of high level government decision-makers failed to seek 
the advice of a broader group of thinkers before they plunged headlong into a 
paranoid “fiasco” that led to President Nixon’s resignation, in the face of certain 
impeachment. 
These four attributes of cognitive narrowness combined to produce a 
treacherous perceptual blindness.  If you don’t see the individual components 
of the crisis as problems, then it is hard to prepare for coherent solutions.  The 
growing subprime lending and reliance on financing from complex, 
unregulated financial products were never seen as problems by the Greenspan-
led Fed.  Chairman Bernanke shared these free market pre-commitments.  Once 
the crisis emerged however, Bernanke quickly abandoned his reluctance to use 
government power to shape a rescue. 
The discipline of macroeconomics itself narrowed the vision of Fed 
leadership. Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, the father of law and econ-
omics, blamed macroeconomics for the failure of the Fed to predict the crisis.193 
 
Macroeconomics and financial economics are highly prestigious 
fields of economics, and the leading macroeconomists and fin-
ance theorists are brilliant people. Yet although the housing 
bubble started to leak air in 2005 and burst in 2006 and the 
economy was in recession from the end of 2007 at the latest and 
the drumbeat of signals warning of an impending crash became 
deafening by the spring of 2008, not enough economists, 
whether in academia, the government, or business, sounded the 
alarm in time to have a significant impact on the government or 
the banking industry. Securitization of mortgages and other debts 
was taken at face value as protecting us against the kind of 
housing-credit bubbles that had ravished East Asian countries in 
the 1990s. In May 2006, Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke 
																																								 																				
192 See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY 
DECISIONS & FIASCOES (1972). 
193 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION 190 (2011) [hereinafter A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM]. 
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said that the housing market was “cooling,” but that this cooling 
was “orderly and moderate” and that the market appeared to be 
“headed for a safe landing.”  His predecessor, Alan Greenspan, 
who in July 2005 had expressed mild concern about housing 
prices, said in October 2006 that the “worst may well be over.194 
 
 One preeminent macroeconomist was caught without an economic 
compass when he refused to say that a recession was underway, yet a mere 30 
days later stated that the evidence that the nation was in a recession was 
conclusive.195 Posner offers this more general critique of macroeconomics:  
 
Even now, the profession seems adrift in uncertainty and irreso-
lution, as if it cannot believe what had happened.  No consensus 
has emerged with regard to how best to respond to the 
depresssion. Most economists seem willing to try virtually 
anything in an effort to dig the economy out of the hole into 
which it’s fallen.196 
 
Shared faith in macroeconomics is the necessary starting point for 
evaluating the two interconnected roles of the Fed as banking regulator and its 
role as guarantor of our national economic stability and freedom from the 
damaging shocks of banking panics. As financial regulator, the Fed is the lead 
government conceptualist with responsibility for articulating coherent rationale 
for government regulation of our system of private financial institutions.  It is, 
of course, also responsible for implementing a system of rules, at once practical 
and logical.  These must be rules that succeed in monitoring and controlling 
the risk-taking propensities of private financial institutions. Theory and reality 
must align. 
My review of the Fed Transcripts, minutes, and other materials from 
the FOMC crisis deliberations supports my agreement with U.C. Berkeley 
sociologists Neil Fligstein, Jonah Stuart Brundage and Michael Schultz 
(hereinafter Fligstein et al.) who argue that: 
 
[The Federal Open Market Committee] failed to see the depth 
of the problem because of its overreliance on macroeconomics 
as a framework for making sense of the economy. As a result 
of this framework, Committee members failed to see the deeper 
																																								 																				
194 Id. at 253.  
195 Id. at 255. 
196 Id. 
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connections between the housing market and the financial 
sector via the securitization of mortgages and the use of 
financial instruments. Thus, they significantly underestimated 
the degree to which the economy was in danger of collapse.197 
 
Fligstein and his colleagues consider the role of macroeconomic 
commitments as the major source of the limited vision revealed in the 2007-9 
transcripts. Fligstein, a sociologist, studies the sociology of markets, with 
special focus on financial markets.198 Fligstein, et al. ask why the Fed was so 
sanguine about the prospects of a limited impact of the contraction in the 
housing market, despite substantial concerns about the problems developing in 
financial markets. 
Primarily, they rely on the theory of “sensemaking” in sociology. Using 
“topic models”199 to map the recurring word patterns in the transcripts of the 
pre-crisis deliberations of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 
Fligstein’s review of meeting transcripts revealed that: 
 
[The FOMC] had surprisingly little recognition that there was a 
serious financial crisis brewing as late as December 2007. This 
lack of awareness was a function of the inability of the FOMC 
to connect the unfolding events into a narrative reflecting the 
links between the housing market, the subprime mortgage 
market, and the financial instruments being used to package the 
mortgages into securities. We use the idea of sensemaking to 
explain how this happened. The Fed’s main analytic framework 
for making sense of the economy, macroeconomic theory, made 
it difficult for them to connect the disparate events that compri-
sed the financial crisis into a coherent whole. 
 
We use topic modeling to analyze transcripts of FOMC meetings held 
between 2000 and 2007, demonstrating that the framework provided by 
macroeconomics dominated FOMC conversations throughout this period. The 
topic models also show that each of the issues involved in the crisis remained 
																																								 																				
197  Neil Fligstein et al., Why the Federal Reserve Failed to See the Financial Crisis of 2008: 
The Role of ‘Macroeconomics’ as a Sensemaking and Cultural Frame 3-4 (Inst. for Research 
on Labor & Employment, Working Paper No. 111-14, 2014). 
198 Biography of Neil Fligstein, UC BERKELEY SOC. DEP’T, http://sociology.berk 
eley.edu/faculty/neil-fligstein. 
199 Fligstein and his colleagues define topic models as “a class of statistical methods that 
attempt to describe underlying semantic regularities in a set of documents by mapping 
recurring relationships between words.” Fligstein et al., supra note 197, at 14. 
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a separate discussion and were never connected together. This Article adds to 
the persuasive Fligstein “sensemaking” explanation by going beyond the 
limitations of the Fed deliberations identified in the sensemaking critique. I 
introduce an interdependent network explanation for why the dynamics of the 
separate elements of the crisis interacted with each other to produce the sudden 
catastrophic failure of the entire global financial system. My discussion of 
network theory in this Article draws most heavily from the physical network 
theories and metaphors of scientists and bankers.200 I have also benefited 
greatly from the work of law professor David Grewal who maps another sphere 
of network theory in globalization. Grewal’s work combines social theory, 
political theory, philosophy, ethics and human freedom to craft an argument 
about the dynamic of the globalization of power.201 The future application of 
network theory in constructing models of systemic financial risk will require a 
creative interdisciplinary perspective that incorporates both the human dimen-
sion of Grewal and the physical science perspective of Gai.  
This combination should yield valuable analyses of how interdependent 
global financial networks behave in order to improve financial regulatory pre-
diction. My discussion of networks below is a hybrid of social interaction in 
financial networks (racial discrimination) and the physical balance sheet fusion 
of regulated systems of formal banks and unregulated shadow banks (shadow 
bank node).  An understanding of both the social and physical properties of 
networks is required to avoid repeating the Fed’s profound economic failures to 
predict the global cascade of financial failure during the crisis.  
 
B. The Fed’s Blindness to the Emerging Literature of Interdependent 
Financial Networks  
 
1. Network Theory for Bankers202 
 
 Banks and other financial intermediaries have a long tradition of 
sharing risk and excess capital through direct interbank lending and loan 
syndications. The traditional forms of connection and sharing of assets and 
																																								 																				
200 U.S. National Academies/National Research Council and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York collaborated to “stimulate fresh thinking on systemic risk” they invited a variety 
researches from different disciplines to explore the conceptual congruence between systemic 
risk in the financial sector and engineering, ecology, epidemiology, of science. John 
Kahmbhu, Scott Weidman & Neel Krishnan, Preface to New Directions for Understanding 
Systemic Risk, 13 ECON. POL’Y REV. i, i (2006). 
201 See generally DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER AND THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF 
GLOBALIZATION (2008). 
202 See generally Robert M. May, Simon A. Levin & George Sugihara, Ecology for Bankers, 
451 NATURE 893 (2008).  
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2017 
 
 
164 
liabilities across broad categories of financial intermediaries were largely 
benign. However, the financial crisis revealed new, more sinister implications 
of a relatively recent phenomenon: the global interconnections between 
regulated, fully capitalized formal commercial banks and the largely 
unregulated shadow banks without capital cushions to protect against adverse 
events, panics, and runs. 
Five years after the crisis, Fed Chair Janet Yellen gave an important 
presentation to the American Economics Association assessing the systemic 
risk concerns that arose during the crisis. Yellen noted that these concerns, 
along with much recent academic research, suggest: 
 
That interconnection among financial intermediaries is not an 
unalloyed good. Complex interactions among market actors 
may serve to amplify existing market frictions, information 
asymmetries, or other externalities. The difficult task before 
market participants, policymakers, and regulators with systemic 
risk responsibilities such as the Federal Reserve is to find ways 
to preserve the benefits of interconnectedness in financial 
markets while managing the potentially harmful side effects.203 
 
In the wake of the Great Recession there has been increasing attention 
within the scholarly literature to the search for explanatory models address-
ing the relationship between systemic risk and interconnectedness.204 In her 
talk, Yellen described five models that illustrate the complexity and density 
of linkages between institutions.205 While recognizing the advantages of 
																																								 																				
203  Once she became Chair, Yellen demonstrated the intellectual curiosity and leadership 
one might expect from an academic economist.  Her speeches to the American Economic 
Association after her confirmation set a new research agenda for the entire macroeconomics 
profession. Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk, supra note 190. 
204  Yellen mentions more than 600 publications since 2007. Id. at 5. 
205  Five models are discussed by Yellen: 1) Allen and Gale model that sustains that systemic 
risk arises through liquidity shocks and has a domino effect in the system. Systems that have 
diversified funding (complete networks) are more resilient to shocks than system where 
funding is not diversified (incomplete networks); 2) Douglas Diamond and Phillip Dybvig 
model, that shows how stress or uncertainty can cause coordination failures in check-clearing 
systems where credit extensions among banks results in institutions “too interconnected to 
fail”; 3) Hyun Song Shin model that explains the complexity of the links between financial 
institutions where interbank claims, that grow and contract far more quickly than economic 
fundamentals, affect the leverage of the institutions involved. During a boom institutions tend 
to increase leverage by borrowing and lending more intensively to each other causing the 
“intertwining claims to extend further and further”; during shocks institutions look for 
deleverage in the short term by withdrawing credit form each other consequently affecting the 
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interconnectedness in the financial system, such as risk sharing and diver-
sification, she also warned of the potential systemic risks these connections 
pose.206  
As I have said, I believe that the study of networks as developed several 
areas of science offers a template for research into financial networks. In their 
article “Ecology for Bankers,” Robert May,207 Simon Levin, and George 
Sugihara explore the similarities between ecosystems and financial systems. 
Both are complex, dynamic, interlinked systems whose stability is threatened 
by conditions that are not always easy to identify except from the perspective 
of the system as a whole—the perspective, I argue, that must be adopted by 
regulators like the Fed.  
 
2. The Shadow Bank Node 
 
“[T]he nation’s financial system had become vulnerable and interconnected in 
ways that were not understood by either the captains of finance or the system’s 
public stewards.”208  
- Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
 
Sheila Bair, Chair of the FDIC during the crisis, noted the potentially 
cataclysmic consequences of the emerging shadow bank connections to the 
large regular banks.209 Bair declared the danger lurking in the shadow banking 
																																								 																				
liability side of other institution’s balance sheet and ultimately forcing them to liquidate assets 
at fire prices; 4) Ricardo Caballero and Alp Simsek model illustrates that a lack of information 
of the participant’s counterparties can create systemic risk in financial networks. The 
“maximum principle” is that “each seeks to maximize profits under the assumption that the 
network is configured in the worst possible manner form its own perspective,” therefore an 
adverse liquidity shock would lead to withdrawn funding from their counterparties, magnifying 
the effects of the initial shock; 5) Gai, Haldane and Kapadia model focus on the range of 
activities and different size and position of the market participants—some banks are larger than 
others, more interconnected than others and some of them are weaker than others. Failure in 
this concentrated network will cause a more serious contagion, thus, understanding these 
relationships helps prevent systemic risk. Id. at 5–10. 
206 “Diversification reduces risk and improves stability. While the idea is compelling, both 
economic research and the events of the financial crisis suggest that it is incomplete.” Id. at 6. 
207 May, supra note 202. 
208 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. One financial industry witness 
before the FCIC said: “All this financial creativity was like ‘cheap sangria’, a lot of cheap 
ingredients packaged to sell at a premium, it might taste good for a while, but then you get 
headaches later.” Transcript of First Public Hearing of the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Commission, Day 
1, Panel 2, Financial Market Participants 14 (Jan. 13, 2010) (statement of Michael Mayo). 
209 See generally SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM 
WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF (2012). 
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node. Bair gives this harrowing account of the unregulated shadow banks that 
held pools of home mortgages in structured investment vehicle (SIVs) that 
were established as trusts. They were hidden from the FDIC right up to the 
moment when the shadow banking node began to fail in August 2007. The 
August 2007 failure followed the model of other interdependent network 
failures.210  Soon there was a cascade of failures running through other nodes, 
unseen by the Federal Reserve, that ended with the Lehman failure in 
September 2008.  Bair provides this detailed account from inside the front lines 
of the global financial crisis:  
 
My first clue was the structured investment vehicle (SIV) 
fiasco, which occurred in August 2007. That was when the 
canary in the coalmine started gasping for breath. A number of 
large financial institutions, led by Citigroup, started having 
trouble accessing enough funding to support their mortgages 
and MBS investments. Citi and a few other large banks had set 
up something called “structured investment vehicles” as a way 
to invest in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. For 
reasons that still today [2013] remain a mystery to me, they 
were allowed by their regulators—the Fed and the OCC—to 
keep the investments off balance sheet, meaning that they were 
not included in the financial reports insured banks filed with us, 
and most important, they were not required to hold capital or 
reserves against those assets to absorb losses.  Indeed, our 
examiners did not know anything about SIVs until the Federal 
Reserve Board alerted us to Citi’s difficulties.211 
 
One of the most notable transformations in the financial system in the 
last twenty years was the growth of shadow banking.212 Before the Great Reces-
sion, the shadow banking system was believed to be no more than a competitor 
of traditional commercial banking. For example, in the 1970s investment banks 
like Merrill Lynch, Fidelity and Vanguard lured deposit customers away from 
																																								 																				
210 See UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 72, for the most 
powerful explanation of the dynamic of cascading failure caused by interconnected bank 
balance sheets.  In addition, I identify the characteristics of the five leading models identified 
by Chairwoman Yellen’s important speech analyzing the characteristics of financial system 
interdependent network failure. Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk, supra note 190. 
211 BAIR, supra note 209, at 73. 
212 Izabella Kaminski, The Terminal Disease Afflicting Banking, FINANCIAL TIMES 
ALPHAVILLE BLOG (July 18, 2012), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/18/1085541/the-term 
inal-disease-afflicting-banking/. See supra note 16 for more information on “shadow banking.” 
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traditional banks by offering high interest rates on transaction accounts that 
functioned exactly like checking accounts, with one important exception: the 
new “cash management accounts” were not covered by deposit insurance.213 
At the time, the Fed believed that in the event of problems, the well-
run, well-capitalized, and well-regulated large commercial banks could pro-
vide vital support for the entire economy, thus rendering the shadow sector 
unimportant as a source of risk to the overall economy.214 This minimizing 
approach to the shadow sector (consisting of commercial paper, asset-backed 
commercial paper, repo, and money market mutual funds) became untenable 
as the value of the shadow banking sector surpassed the value of the formal 
banking sector by 2006.215 In addition to the growing value of the shadow 
sector, the pervasive links between the two systems would later render the 
traditional banking system so deeply obligated for off-balance-sheet activities 
transferred to the shadow sector that the formal sector would become impotent 
to provide adequate liquidity without extraordinary emergency support from 
the Fed.  Thus, the cascading effects of the runs on Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers precipitated a general panic and eventually the crash. 
The Federal Reserve was startled to discover during the financial crisis 
that the formal banking system and the shadow banking system had become 
inseparable. Selected failures within the shadow system had sparked a panic 
because of the system’s lack of transparency, and this opacity in turn triggered 
a rolling sequence of panic in both other shadow participants and the deeply 
interconnected conventional commercial banks, which were then called on to 
back up their shadow partners. Unfortunately, the commercial banking sector 
lacked sufficient total liquidity to stabilize both systems. This illiquidity, in 
turn, threatened the failure of the entire global financial system.216 
Macroeconomist Gary Gorton describes this new form of panic in the 
shadow banking sector as follows: 
 
Economists view the world as being the outcome of the 
“invisible hand,” that is, a world where private decisions are 
unknowingly guided by prices to allocate resources efficiently. 
 
The credit crisis raises the question of how it is that we could 
get slapped in the face by the invisible hand. What happened? 
Many private decisions were made, over a long time, which 
																																								 																				
213  FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 29. 
214  Id. at 28. 
215  Id. at 32, Figure 2.1. 
216 See generally ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING 
(2012). 
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created the shadow banking system. That system was vulnerable 
to a banking panic. The U.S. had a banking panic starting in 
August 2007, one that continues today. But banking panics, you 
say, like the one in the movie “It’s a Wonderful Life,” don’t 
happen anymore. 
 
Indeed, until these recent events, most people did not think of 
banking panics as something to be concerned about. After all, 
the panics of the Great Depression are a dim memory. Since 
1934 when deposit insurance was adopted, until the current 
panic–a span of almost 75 years–there had been no banking 
panics.217 
 
A review of regulatory decisions since as early as 1995 and more 
intensively during the early 2000s makes it clear that US regulators were blind 
to the elephant in the room—the deep and complex interconnections that had 
emerged between the shadow banks and the commercial banking system. As 
late as September 2008, after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the Fed did not 
recognize that the interdependent networks of racialized subprime lending, 
securitization, structured products, off-balance-sheet accounting, and the 
embedded risks of unregulated short-term funding markets were inseparably 
linked to the heavily regulated commercial banking system and the investment 
banks. The deadly synergy of free-market ideology and GroupThink homo-
geneity made the Fed Board of Governors ideally suited to overlook the factors 
triggering a deadly cascade of failures that overwhelmed the Board and 
required it to do “whatever it takes” to avoid a global financial calamity. 
 
3. The Race Node 
 
The post-crisis literature has failed to engage racial discrimination as a 
source of systemic risk.218 Fed Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin’s remarkable 
leadership has begun a conversation about the role of racially discriminatory 
lending in the financial crisis.219 This Article is intended to extend that important 
																																								 																				
217  See generally Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the 
Panic of 2007 (Yale & NBER, Working Paper, 2009). 
218  There is a robust literature discussing racial discrimination in home mortgage origination, 
however, none to date takes up the systemic role that racial discrimination played in the 
Crisis. 
219 See, e.g., Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
“Aspects of Inequality in the Recent Business Cycle” at “Building a Financial Structure for 
a More Stable and Equitable Economy” the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on 
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conversation. It is crucial to elevate the consideration of the persistent problem 
of racial discrimination in economically important markets such as housing. The 
Federal Reserve is the most robust econometric organization in the world, yet, 
as noted earlier, there is not a single reference to race or racial discrimination to 
be found in 1,800 pages of Board transcripts and speeches from 2007 to 2008.220  
In my view, this cognitive omission of racial discrimination from the 
framework of factors that matter in setting capital levels, leverage ratios, and 
enforcement policies for both the formal and shadow systems will be a 
continuing vulnerability of the global banking system as long as the inter-
connectedness among a large variety of regulated and unregulated entities 
remains unrecognized. Race and economic inequality factors belong on any 
map of interdependent financial networks. 
As I discuss more fully below, the network theory approach to systemic 
risk is promising because it proceeds on the assumption that as in electrical and 
other physically interdependent systems, a failure in a small node of an interde-
pendent financial network can trigger a cascade of failure in the entire system. 
This Article does not attempt to provide an economic data-driven 
model of race and inequality as integrated components of systemic risk.  My 
task here is to provide one approach to answering the difficult question of why 
the Fed failed to perceive the interlinkage among network nodes of systemic 
risk. Through the lens of interdependent financial network theory, I show that 
one of these nodes, racial discrimination in home mortgage origination, 
contributed to the cascade of failures leading to the crisis. 
The Fed can’t solve problems to which it is blind. My aim is to 
encourage the Fed to do what it does best, create quantitative measurements of 
economic inequality and racial discrimination to make visible what it did not 
see as a source of systemic risk during the mortgage debt bubble.  If the way 
to the Fed’s heart and mind is through quantitative language, then normative 
inequality scholarship such as mine must provide a bridge from the status quo 
to a new understanding that transcends the macroeconomic, data-driven culture 
of the Fed.   
																																								 																				
the State of the U.S. and World Economies, (Apr. 18, 2013) (stating that minorities are one 
of the groups that bear the brunt of a downturn because they are more likely to experience 
flat or declining wages, reduced hours, and unemployment during a recession); see also 
GEORGE J. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY 
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009) (providing 
an examination of why poverty rates are consistently higher among minorities); Sarah Bloom 
Raskin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Aspects of Inequality in the Recent 
Business Cycle (Apr. 18, 2013).   
220 FOMC TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 188. This assertion is based on my personal Boolean 
search for the word “Race!” in Federal Reserve transcripts 2007-2008. 
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In order to “put the pieces of the puzzle together” and “imagine”221 the 
coming collapse, the Fed would have had to observe and interpret signals from 
many disparate but interdependent networks, signals that taken together posed 
massive systemic risk. In what follows I discuss a problem that particularly 
highlights the interdependent network risks that surprised the Fed and are 
central to the story of the failures of 2008: racially discriminatory subprime 
loans.   
 
C. Deregulation: Faith in the Power of Self-Correcting Markets 
 
The lack of disciplinary consensus within macroeconomics allowed 
ideology and political commitments to dominate economic arguments.  Posner 
leveled this charge as well. “The divisions within the economics profession 
over fundamental issues of policy gave political preferences free rein to shape 
economic policy.”222   
Where was the Fed in all this?223 “In 2005, Alan Greenspan, then 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, praised subprime mortgages as a 
positive innovation made possible by better risk assessment. . . .  Only two 
years later, there was growing concern that failing subprime loans, which had 
shot up to nearly a quarter of the total mortgage market originations, were 
driving our economy into recession.”224 Beyond macroeconomics, the hybrid 
ideology of law and economics allows us to consider the impact of relaxed 
legal rules. First, consider the non-enforcement of prohibitions against unfair 
lending practices in home mortgage origination.   
For example, Bob Gnaizda, the general counsel and policy director of 
the Greenlining Institute, a California-based nonprofit housing group, told the 
Commission that he began meeting with Greenspan at least once a year starting 
in 1999, each time highlighting to him the growth of predatory lending practices 
and discussing with him the social and economic problems they were creating.225 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) concluded that the 
entire financial crisis could have been avoided with more vigilant regulatory 
oversight.  The FCIC singles out the Fed for this especially withering criticism. 
																																								 																				
221 Bernanke, supra note 171, at 82. 
222 A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 193, at 273. 
223 Binyamin Appelbaum, Fed Held Back as Evidence Mounted on Subprime Loan Abuses, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/09/26/AR2009092602706.html?sid=ST2009122002648. 
224 SONIA GARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CONTINUED DECAY AND 
SHAKY REPAIRS: THE STATE OF SUBPRIME LOANS TODAY 2 (2009). 
225 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 9.  
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Little meaningful action was taken to quell the threats in a 
timely manner. The prime example is the Federal Reserve’s 
pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages. The Federal 
Reserve was the one entity empowered to so and it did not.226 
 
Fidelity to the tenets of law and economics was perhaps the single- 
deadliest feature of myopia during the crisis. The reinforcing legal component 
of law and economics with its strong preference for private markets over legal 
rules led to the Board’s first big failures: failure to intervene as the market 
proliferated racially exploitative loans227 and failure to prevent the subsequent 
cascade of failures.  
Macroeconomics has virtually nothing to say about racial discrimi-
nation.228 It was the overriding belief in self-correcting markets that led 
Greenspan229 and other board members to simply dismiss “as anecdotal”230 the 
mounting evidence of pervasive racial discrimination in unregulated 
originations flooding minority communities.  The legal arguments of Richard 
Posner, derived from Coase, had prevailed in government policy circles in the 
1970s through the economic collapse in 2008.    
Posner, of course, is the father of law and economics.  His seminal 
casebook, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, bridged the disciplinary divide 
between economics and law.  Posner tells us that the conception of economics 
he adopted for this casebook was that “economics is the science of rational 
choice.”231  In 1992, Posner accepted this challenge for testing the value of his 
contributions to what he called “positive” economic theory: An important test 
of a theory is its ability to explain reality.  If it does a lousy job, the reason may 
be that its assumptions are insufficiently realistic.232 
																																								 																				
226  Id. at xvii 
227 Id. at xviii. 
228  But see GEORGE J. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
(2009) for a welcome exception to my claim that macroeconomics is silent on racial 
discrimination.  
229  Greenspan to his credit did admit, with qualifications, this flaw in his thinking when 
questioned by Congressman Waxman. 
230 Ruhi Maker, a Rochester, NY foreclosure lawyer, reported that she met with Fed Board 
members Bernanke, Bies and Ferguson in October 2004.  During that meeting Maker told 
the Board members that she had identified Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers as the financial 
firms that “were producing such bad loans that the very survival of the firm was put in 
question.” “We repeatedly see false appraisals and false income.”  Maker testified that “Fed 
officials seemed impervious to what the consumer advocates were saying.” FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 15-16. 
231 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998). 
232 Id. at 19. 
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But, curiously, the transcripts when combined with the authoritative 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission autopsy reveal that Bernanke had an 
incomplete commitment to government rescues of failing financial firms.  As, 
I discuss below, these transcripts provide for the first time persuasive evidence 
of the basis for the still incoherent distinction between the rescue of Bear 
Stearns-Lehman Brothers- AIG flip flops on the moral hazard of government 
bailouts.  The transcripts show that the Fed wanted to send a signal that it would 
let some, but not all, firms fail.  The internal discussion of Lehman Brothers in 
the summer and early fall of 2008 supports my “mixed signals,” “incomplete 
commitment” to free markets interpretation. 
Paul Krugman, the progressive Nobel Laureate, and Richard Posner, 
the conservative founder of the law and economics movement—two public 
intellectuals who rarely agree on anything—separately criticize the Fed’s 
failure to predict this once in three generations financial crisis. Krugman’s 
diagnosis was delivered early and often, from his column in the New York 
Times. One early example, occurred in August 2007, one month before the full-
blown crisis erupted. Krugman’s assessment of the Fed was blunt.  He wrote 
about KKR Financial, an investment firm that was not regulated by the Fed or 
covered by deposit insurance, but provided funding for mortgage loans like 
depositors in the old-fashioned depository bank. When KKR announced that it 
couldn’t meet $5 billion of its obligations. Krugman concluded that: 
 
[I]n economic terms what’s been happening amounts to a 
burgeoning banking panic. . . . On Friday, the Federal Reserve 
tried to quell this panic by announcing a surprise cut in the 
discount rate, the rate at which it lends money to banks. Fed’s 
move is largely symbolic. It makes more funds available to 
depository institutions, a.k.a. old-fashioned banks—but old-
fashioned banks aren’t where the crisis is centered. And the Fed 
doesn’t have any clear way to deal with bank runs on institutions 
that aren’t called banks.233   
 
Posner’s evaluation, in particular, was quite harsh234:  
 
Macroeconomics and financial economics are highly presti-
gious fields of economics, and the leading macroeconomists 
and finance theorists are brilliant people.  Yet although the 
housing bubble started to leak air in 2005 and burst in 2006 and 
																																								 																				
233 Paul Krugman, It’s a Miserable Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2007, at A19, 
https://nyti.ms/2kASuLe. 
234 A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 193, at 253–54. 
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the economy was in recession from the end of 2007 at the latest 
and the drumbeat of signals warning of an impending crash 
became deafening by the spring of 2008, not enough 
economists, whether in academia, the government, or business, 
sounded the alarm in time to have a significant impact on the 
government or the banking industry.  Securitization of mort-
gages and other debts was taken at face value as protecting us 
against the kind of housing-credit bubbles that had ravished 
East Asian countries in the 1990s.  In May 2006, Federal 
Reserve chairman Bernanke said that the housing market was 
“cooling,” but that this cooling was “orderly and moderate” and 
that the market appeared to be “headed for a safe landing.”  His 
predecessor, Alan Greenspan, who in July 2005 had expressed 
mild concern about housing prices, said in October 2006 that 
the “worst may well be over.” . . . But [these] statements by 
Greenspan and Bernanke . . . were misleading; they made 
things worse.235 
 
Across ideological lines, a stable consensus has formed. The financial 
crisis was the result of a profound economic miscalculation. The Federal 
Reserve did not anticipate the financial crisis until it was too late.  
Posner similarly penetrating critique of the Fed is perhaps even more 
problematic than Krugman’s because his work in the early 1970s adopting 
economics Nobel Laureate Gary Becker’s view of the market dynamics of 
racial discrimination provided the foundation for the deregulatory approach to 
racial discrimination in markets, an approach that certainly influenced Fed 
Chair Alan Greenspan’s thinking about whether to enforce the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994. 
This section of the paper introduces a framework that tries to make 
sense of the Fed’s otherwise inexplicable miscalculation. I address two 
questions. First, why didn’t the Fed see the crisis coming, and second, when 
the crisis was just days away?  Why did the Fed resort to ad hoc solutions 
without a well-developed plan of action?  
The second question can be answered more easily than the first. In an 
emergency, the adrenaline flows and chaotic human reactions take over. In his 
last speech before he ended his term as Fed chair, Ben Bernanke expressed his 
own disorientation when the crisis erupted in September 2008.  “If you’re in a 
car wreck or something, you’re mostly involved in trying to avoid going off the 
																																								 																				
235 Id. at 253–54. 
 
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2017 
 
 
174 
bridge. And then, later on, you say, ‘Oh my God!’”236 Bernanke’s car wreck 
metaphor certainly does capture the frenzied reaction to the crisis and the incon-
sistent initial response, but it doesn’t offer any insight as to why there was a crash. 
Cognitive narrowness provides a useful way of answering both ques-
tions. I identify four, sometimes overlapping characteristics of cognitive 
narrowness: (1) an ideological commitment to free markets; (2) the narrow band 
of macroeconomic professional training and expertise within the Fed’s Board of 
Governors; (3) the problem of cognitive homogeneity as modeled by decisional 
economist Scott Page, who shows that a lack of diverse perspectives, diverse 
heuristics, and diverse cognitive tools combines to produce an unwitting 
perceptual blindness; and (4) the “Groupthink” syndrome, first identified by 
Yale social psychologist Irving Janis, who catalogued patterns of self-censorship 
and narrow consultation with outside experts in high-level government policy 
groups, patterns yielding a consensus that results in “fiascoes.” 
If cognitive narrowness prevents you from seeing the components of a 
crisis as problems, then it is hard to envision solutions. The growth of subprime 
lending and the reliance on unregulated financial instruments were never seen 
as problems by the Greenspan-led Fed. Chairman Bernanke shared his 
predecessor’s free-market commitments, but once the crisis emerged, he 
quickly abandoned his reluctance to use government power to shape a rescue.  
Curiously, the transcripts of closed meetings of the Federal Reserve 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) during the most intense phase of the global 
financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, along with the authoritative FCIC autopsy, 
reveal that Bernanke’s commitment to government rescue of failing financial 
firms was incomplete. As I discuss below, the new transcripts provide one 
persuasive explanation for the still incoherent decision to rescue Bear Stearns 
but not Lehman Brothers, just five months later, followed by the massive 
bailout for AIG. The Fed wanted to send a signal that it would let some but not 
all firms fail. The Fed was still in thrall to law and economics and the moral 
hazard critique of market-based incentives to curtail excessive risk-taking. The 
FOMC discussion of Lehman Brothers’ problems during the summer of 2008 
after the Bear Stearns rescue supports this interpretation.  
The FOMC transcripts contain no complete surprises, but they breathe 
life into the consequences of human failures of cognition and perception, and 
they provide confirmation of my argument that three crucial factors led to the 
Federal Reserve’s failure to anticipate the sudden near-collapse of the global 
financial system.  
																																								 																				
236 Martin Crutsinger, Bernanke Likens ’08 Financial Crisis to Car Crash, SAN DIEGO TRIB, 
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-bernanke-likens-08-financial-
crisis-to-car-crash-2014jan16-story.html (quoting Ben Bernanke during his final public 
appearance as chairman of the Federal Reserve) 
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First, adherence to incomplete or erroneous macroeconomic and 
ideological frameworks about how financial markets work led the Fed to 
focus on inflation, just as the risks of incoherent financial deregulation 
reached their peak. One source of this narrowness was the homogeneous 
disciplinary training of board members in macroeconomic theory. 
Second, the Fed was unaware of the networked danger of rapidly 
accumulating risks and the corresponding growth of the completely 
unregulated financial networks created by its decision not to rein in racially 
targeted subprime lending. By 2000 these networks exceeded the size of the 
formal banking system; by 2007 the formal banking system had a value of 
$10.5 trillion, and the shadow sector had a value of $13 trillion.237 There is 
persuasive evidence that the Fed did not see how its program of aggressive 
deregulation created opaque transactions about which even it lacked 
information concerning the identity of counterparties or the size and comp-
osition of various short-term financing entities. 
Without this basic balance sheet information, the Fed lacked 
indispensable tools to assess the quantity and quality of these unseen risks. 
Moreover, without capital requirements, this burgeoning no-regulation zone 
grew without a safety net. The Fed’s aggressive deregulatory approach before 
the crisis severely compromised its ability to monitor and control the 
escalating risk in the shadow market. It could not regulate or plan for the 
impact of an exploding bubble whose growth it had blindly stimulated 
through deregulation. The Fed is the only monetary, economic, and financial 
regulator in the world with the independent power to backstop the global 
financial system by creating $12.8 trillion based solely on a vote of 14 
members of the FOMC, headed by the chairman of the Federal Reserve. The 
paradox of the Fed’s unique power is that despite its unrivalled global 
economic and monetary status, and because of its cognitive narrowness, it 
simply could not connect its decade of deregulation to the emergence of the 
shadow banking system and its contribution to the growing problem of 
economic inequality.  
For a long time, the American-led transformation of the global 
financial system and the emergence of a deeply interconnected network of 
interdependent financial nodes sparked pride in a stable, prosperous US 
financial system. A story of American economic and financial exceptionalism 
prevailed, until just days after it all fell down in September 2008. 
 
 
																																								 																				
237  FOMC TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 188.  
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III. WHAT CAN THE FED DO ABOUT INEQUALITY? 
 
A. Overview 
 
The answer to the question that drives this section, “What can the Fed 
Do About Inequality?” depends, in part, on your economic and political 
commitments.238 First, the Fed must learn from its overreliance on the narrow 
cognitive framework of conventional macroeconomics.  It must assess the 
opportunity to mitigate and install organizational structures to create counter 
dynamics to lessen the effects of groupthink.239 
For some, the Federal Reserve is a non-elected political entity.240   
Another view is that the Fed is a largely non-political, technical manager of the 
routine monetary policy decisions that affect the health of our economy.241 
																																								 																				
238 Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Occupy Wall Street and the Political Economy of 
Inequality, THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (2012), http://people.umass.edu/adube/DubeKaplan_ 
EV_OWS_2012.pdf. 
239 The Dodd-Frank created Financial Stability Oversight Committee is the place where these 
changes should be implemented.  However, the six years of FSOC show it to be intensely 
concerned with a new narrow program of regulatory oversight: the size of and designation 
of Systemically Important Institutions (SIFI’s). The size of banks and other non-bank 
financial institutions will certainly be important, but not to the exclusion of the factors I have 
identified in this article. 
240 This view is represented by political odd bedfellows, Sen Bernie Sanders (I- Vermont) 
and Ron Paul (R-Ky).  Sanders objects to the bank bailouts and inequality effects of the Fed’s 
2008 crisis programs.  Paul and his father before him argue that the “loose monetary policy” 
of the Fed is the cause of boom and bust economic cycle.  The Pauls’ call for a return to the 
gold standard. A view rejected by most economists and applauded by “political movements 
on the right.”  Emily Cadei, Paul, Sanders Join Forces Against Federal Reserve, NEWS-
WEEK, Jan. 13, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/paul-sanders-join-forces-fed-414926. 
241 The Federal Reserve itself adopts the non- political technocrat view of its role in the 
economy.  The Fed describes itself to members of the public as follows:  
 
Policymakers, academics, and other informed observers around the world 
have reached broad consensus that the goals of monetary policy should be 
established by the political authorities, but the conduct of monetary policy 
in pursuit of those goals should be free from political influence. Careful 
empirical studies support the view that central banks able to conduct day-
to-day monetary policy operations free of political pressure. 
 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO 
SEPARATE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE?, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/why-is-it-important-to-separate-federal-reserve-monetary-
policy-decisions-from-political-influence.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
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Those who believe that Fed monetary, bank regulatory and macro-
economic responsibilities are beyond politics, also subscribe to the view that 
the Fed has no role to play in causing or ameliorating the profoundly inter-
twined American problems of race and economic inequality.242 
The Federal Reserve today is the product of long-running political 
argument that can be traced to the founding of the nation.243 The founding 
fathers were deeply divided about the place for a central monetary authority.244 
Hamilton favored a strong central government institution to manage the national 
debt, control economic activity and establish the international creditworthiness 
of the new nation.245  Jefferson and Madison adamantly opposed a strong central 
bank, on the model of the privately owned Bank of England.  They feared the 
centralized control of the credit available to local farmers and businesses.   
These two opposing original strands of the political economy of American 
banking persist today. 1. Central government control of the levers of economic 
power by northern financiers and foreign investors vs 2. Decentralized financial 
institutions that fed American growth in the agrarian, slave-holding South.  
Fear and suspicion of an all-powerful central bank that could favor one 
region or political faction over another curtailed the short charters of the First 
Bank of the United States (1791-1811); and fueled President Jackson’s populist 
campaign and ultimate veto of renewing the Second Bank charter (1816-1836).  
These political divisions gave rise to a seventy-seven-year period when there 
was no central bank, until 1913 when the Federal Reserve was established.246 
 The Fed was created as a part of a progressive agenda,247 including a 
reaction to the Panic of 1907 and the dominance of Wall St. banking baron, J. 
P. Morgan’s handling of the panic with a syndicate of financiers who pooled 
capital to serve as private “lenders of last resort.”  Progressives were outraged 
by the corruption and many conflicts of interest when a cabal of private bankers 
decided which trusts, and the stocks they held, would be bailed out.248 The 
																																								 																				
242 BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, THE ECONOMICS OF RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (2015). 
243 WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE 
COUNTRY 243. 
244 Id. 
245 See generally RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2004). Chernow’s magnificent 
account of the first Secretary of the Treasury is reported to be the source for the always sold out 
hip-hop Broadway musical “Hamilton.” Curt Schleier, The Jewish Historian Behind Broadway’s 
Hip-Hop Hit ‘Hamilton’, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL, Sept. 14, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/ 
the-jewish-historian-behind-broadways-hip-hop-hit-hamilton/.historynewsnetwork.org/article/ 
160622. 
246 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: VOLUME I 1913-1951 (2003). 
247 GREIDER, supra note 243, at 243. 
248 See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND 
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE, 128 (1990). This National Book Award winner tells a 
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Progressive reformers succeeded in passing the progressive income tax of 
1913, and the Federal Reserve act that same year. However, “the agrarian 
reformers were defeated, their popular movement crushed. Their political 
energy was first co-opted by the Democrats and then vanquished by the 
Republicans. The central bank that Congress eventually created in 1913 was 
not at all what the Populists had in mind.”249 
The Fed emerged fitfully, over 95 years from a weak decentralized 
quasi-government entity with power in the 12 regional banks, as a political 
concession to the longstanding concern about the potential dominance of 
northeastern financiers.  The dismal performance of the passive Fed that raised 
interest rates during the Great Depression is now legendary.250 
With this political history in mind, in what follows, I portray the Fed as 
a political entity bearing the distinguished DNA of our national political 
economy of banking.  I argue here that the Fed seeks to mask its political power 
in complex mathematical models of the economy devoid of connection to, or 
responsibility for any of the messy problems of American economic life such as 
racism, the role of bank regulation and monetary policy in distributing the wealth 
of the nation.251  
With this political history in mind, in what follows, I portray the Fed as 
a political entity bearing the distinguished DNA of our national political 
economy of banking.  I argue here that the Fed seeks to mask its political power 
in complex mathematical models of the economy, devoid of connection to, or 
responsibility for any of the messy problems of American economic life such as 
racism, the role of bank regulation and monetary policy in distributing the wealth 
of the nation.   
 
B. The Fed Must Be Mandated to Develop Thick Macroeconomic and 
Financial Systemic Risk Models for the Growing Wealth Inequality 
 
 The Federal Reserve conducts a triennial survey of the distribution of 
wealth. In 2014, Chairman Janet L. Yellen highlighted the importance of this 
survey of consumer finances in examining the increasing concentration of wealth 
																																								 																				
detailed, gripping account of the life of Wall St. titan, J.P Morgan, based on exclusive access 
to previously private collection of Morgan’s personal papers.  The chapter on the Panic of 
1907 provides a definitive account of the conflicts of interest in Morgan’s handling of the 
panic and the political accommodation he received from President Theodore Roosevelt, 
despite Roosevelt’s otherwise firm commitments to Progressivism.  Id. at 128. 
249 See GREIDER, supra note 243, at 254, for a history on the origins of the Federal Reserve. 
250 See supra Section II.A.1 for a discussion on the failures of Ben’s Fed during the Great 
Depression. 
251 PIKETTY, supra note 92. 
 
Vol. 2:1]   The Hidden Structures of Inequality 
 
 
179 
at the very top of our economic distribution.  Yellen sounded a clarion call to con-
sider the deep social, economic and political impact of this unequal distribution: 
 
It is no secret that the past few decades of widening inequality 
can be summed up as significant income and wealth gains for 
those at the very top and stagnant living standards for the 
majority. I think it is appropriate to ask whether this trend is 
compatible with values rooted in our nation's history, among 
them the high value Americans have traditionally placed on 
equality of opportunity.252   
 
 There is recent evidence that Fed Board economists are beginning to 
use this data to learn about the essential components of the racial and wealth 
disparities that drive vulnerability to market predation.253 However, this 
preliminary descriptive investigation of racial wealth variables is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition, to build more sophisticated models of both macro-
economic and systemic risk arising from the conditions of racial discrimination 
in housing finance markets and the historic wealth disparity between blacks 
and whites. 
 Can the Fed be expected to build more sophisticated macroeconomic 
or financial systemic risk models to incorporate the role of racial wealth 
differences in assessing the vulnerabilities to the financial system?  The answer 
is no, at least not immediately, according to leading academic researchers, the 
thin models of macroeconomic mapping of the dynamics of inequality is still 
at a very rudimentary stage.254 
																																								 																				
252 Janet L. Yellen, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Perspectives on 
Inequality and Opportunity from the Survey of Consumer Finances Chair Janet L. Yellen, 
Speech at the Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen201410 
17a.html.   
253 THOMPSON, JEFFREY P. & GUSTAVO A. SUAREZ, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD DIVISIONS OF 
RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION 
SERIES (2015). 
254 One doctoral student in economics conducted a survey of the literature on macroeconomic 
models of inequality. He noted that “[t]he key phrase in the academic literature is 
"heterogeneous agent model", which is a catch-all for macroeconomic models whose 
dynamics can't be summarized by the wealth of a stand-in representative agent . . .  
household-level wealth heterogeneity . . . is not generally considered to be particularly 
important to understanding macroeconomic dynamics.  A handful of interesting references 
employing this sort of model.” Erik Madsen, Ph.D. candidate in Economic Analysis and 
Policy, Stanford GSB, “Are there any macroeconomic models of inequality?” QUORA, 
https://www.quora.com/Are-there-any-macroeconomic-models-of-inequality. 
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Mian and Sufi, tell us that: 
 
The distribution of income/wealth matters a great deal for 
thinking about the macro-economy. Convincing some of this fact 
is not easy—many continue to work within a modeling 
framework in which all distributional considerations are assumed 
away, the so-called “representative-agent” framework.255  
 
 Therefore, although one might welcome a revolutionary insight from 
policymakers on the Board, the limitations of the field of macroeconomics will 
prove to be a drag on future possibilities for the necessary policy change that I 
call for here.  
 
C. The Fed Must Identify and Incorporate Social and Political 
Financial Patterns of Exploitation in Models of Systemic Risk 
 
 My discussion of the history of racial discrimination in housing above 
supports this proposal.  In addition, Nobel laureates Akerlof and Shiller argue 
persuasively that the nature of free markets makes predation and manipulation 
inevitable features of most markets256 Akerlof and Shiller provide further 
support from the field of economics for my argument that the Fed should 
include these longstanding patterns of market manipulation, including racial 
discrimination in systemic risk models of how our economy works.  
 
D. The Fed Must Understand and Incorporate the Regulatory  
Implications of Piketty’s Insight 
 
 According to Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman’s review of CAPITAL 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, Piketty has sparked a revolution in our 
understanding of long-term trends in inequality, concluding that Piketty’s 
work is: 
 
A tour de force of economic modeling, an approach that integra-
tes the analysis of economic growth with that of the distribution 
																																								 																				
255 Atif Mian & Amirand Sufi, House of Debt Blog, Why the Income Distribution Matters 
for Macroeconomics, HOUSE OF DEBT BLOG (Mar. 27, 2014), http://houseofdebt.org/2014 
/03/27/why-income-distribution-matters-for-macroeconomics.html. 
256 GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF 
MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (2015). 
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of income and wealth. This is a book that will change both the 
way we think about society and the way we do economics.257 
 
 Piketty’s intervention in economic analysis of inequality is not without 
critics. Krugman highlights the objections of influential University of Chicago 
macroeconomist Robert Lucas:  
 
Some economists (not to mention politicians) tried to shout down 
any mention of inequality at all: “Of the tendencies that are harm-
ful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the 
most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.” 258 
 
If Krugman, but not Lucas, is right about the importance of Piketty’s 
economic models of inequality, we must ask the Fed to engage this insight 
directly and fashion an intellectually defensible response. 
Yale law professor David Grewal understands the connection between 
law, financial regulation and Piketty’s insight.  In his review of Piketty’s 
scholarship, Grewal sees the legal regulatory implication of Piketty’s insight.  
For Grewal, Piketty’s insight creates an opportunity to develop an agenda 
exploring the legal rules that structure and enforce capitalism.259 
 
E. The Fed Must Have an Integrated Monitor of Household Debt Levels and 
Consider Systemic Risk Implications of Imprudent Levels of Such Debt 
 
As income and wealth inequality rise, the gap for the bottom 90% is fill-
ed with imprudent personal debt. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,260  
Mian and Sufi,261 and Raghuram G. Rajan262 all make the point that consumer 
																																								 																				
257 Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 8, 
2014) (book review) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, supra note 92) http://www.nybooks. 
com/articles/2014/05/08/thomaspikettynewgildedage/. 
258 Id. 
259 David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 628 (2014) (book 
review) (asserting that PIKETTY, supra note 92, “prompted discussion of inequality, financial reg-
ulation, and political economy across an unusually wide spectrum”).  For further valuable contri-
butions to our understanding of capitalism as a legal order, see STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS 
CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW (2012) and 
Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From Market 
Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 369 (2009). 
260 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 9, at 83–101. 
261 See generally ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED 
THE GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN (2014). 
262 See generally RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES (2010). 
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debt is a canary in the coal mine for systemic risk.  I am persuaded by these 
insights and empirical evidence. Therefore, I urge that the Fed and possibly 
FSOC incorporate undue expansions of consumer debt into models of financial 
systemic risk and macroeconomic predictions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
“[A]lthough the financiers bear the primary responsibility for the depression, I 
do not think they can be blamed for it – implying moral censure – any more 
than one can blame a lion for eating a zebra. Capitalism is Darwinian.”263 
 
- Richard Posner 
Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit  
 
As I have discussed, contrary to the conventional wisdom that “the 
Federal Reserve does not have a role in creating or ameliorating the problem of 
economic inequality in America,” my analysis of the Financial Crisis of 2008 
directly implicates the Fed in a central role before the crisis. The Fed’s program 
of radical deregulation of financial markets and new financial products set the 
stage for a market without fences in which the lions ate the zebras. 
During the crisis the Fed’s failure to see the converging nodes of the 
interdependent networks of a transformed global financial system meant that it 
was caught unawares. It did not have a plan; it resorted to its ideological pre-
commitments as the basis for distributing emergency lending worth 12.8 
trillion dollars.   
In this Article I do not take up the question of the Fed’s democratic 
accountability for this enormous control of the wealth of this nation during 
the crisis and for many years in the future.  Among the many questions that 
invite my attention for future research are: the matter of democratic 
accountability and transparency of Federal Reserve powers; what is the 
meaning of the transformation of the New Deal banking safety net requiring 
separation of insured deposits from speculative investments, regulated capital 
levels to internalize and restrain risk in exchange for emergency lending to 
respond to banking sector panics?  Have we entered a new era in which the 
genie of regulatory control of financial innovation and its attendant risks 
cannot be put back into the bottle? Is the “Bernanke Doctrine” of rescuing 
private financial firms without regulation or requirements for traditional cash 
buffers to protect taxpayers or transparent fully explanatory balance sheets 
now a fait accompli? 
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Who is responsible for ensuring that homeownership, the centerpiece 
of middle- and working-class wealth potential, is financed with stable, 
suitable financial products that lead to eventual ownership? Transitory occu-
pancy of homes that never yield real wealth, or the community stability 
associated with the pride of eventual complete ownership is a cruel economic 
hoax. A central role of government is to mediate the market forces that mani-
pulate the deep longing for participation in homeownership as a fundamental 
marker of economic citizenship.264 And the central question for extended 
academic and policy discussion on this issue should be: What can the Fed do 
about inequality?265 
 
																																								 																				
264 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944 State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944) (“We 
have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without 
economic security and independence . . . We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of 
Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all—
regardless of station, race, or creed.  Among these [is] . . . [t]he right of every family to a 
decent home.”) 
265 Here, I am echoing Yellen’s own comments during her nomination hearing.  See Yellen 
Nomination, supra note 1, at 4–36.  “[W]e have seen a huge rise in income inequality . . . .  
It is not that we have not had pretty strong productivity growth for much of this time in the 
country. But the disproportionate share of those gains have gone to the top ten percent, and 
even to the top one percent. So this is an extremely difficult and, to my mind, very worrisome 
problem.” Id. 
